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Last Term, the Supreme Court sent ominous signals about the future of
federal antidiscrimination law. The Court twice ruled that Congress lacked
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact laws
prohibiting discrimination.' In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,2 the
Court concluded that Section 5 did not give Congress the power to abrogate
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t. The relevant sections of the Fourteenth Amendment provide:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
2. 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
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state Eleventh Amendment immunity for suits under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and in United States v.
Morrison,4 the Court held that Congress was without power under either the
Commerce Clause or Section 5 to enact a provision of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994 (VAWA)5 creating a federal civil remedy for victims
of gender-motivated violence.6
Both Kimel and Morrison are written in forceful and broad strokes that
threaten large stretches of congressional authority under Section 5. Yet the
Court's Section 5 holdings were rendered without dissent.7 Although in
Kimel there were four Justices prepared to disagree strenuously with the
decision's liberal interpretation of Eleventh Amendment immunity,' and
although in Morrison there were four Justices prepared to disagree
strenuously with the decision's restrictive interpretation of federal
Commerce Clause power,9 not a single Justice in either case was ready to
vote to sustain congressional power under Section 5, even as Justice Breyer
identified key deficiencies in Morrison's justification for its Section 5
holding."0
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
4. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
5. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994).
6. The provision that was struck down can be found at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
7. For a discussion, see Walter Dellinger & Jonathan Hacker, 14th Amendment Is Real Issue
in Federalism Cases, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 7, 2000, at A28.
8. Indeed, the disagreement was so intense that the four dissenting Justices explicitly refused
to be bound by "stare decisis" and "to accept" recent decisions "as controlling precedents."
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 653 (2000) (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, JJ., dissenting). Stevens concluded: "The kind of judicial activism manifested in
cases like Seminole Tribe ... represents such a radical departure from the proper role of this Court
that it should be opposed whenever the opportunity arises." Id. at 653-54 (citations omitted). The
exasperation of the majority is also evident: "Justice Stevens disputes that well-established
precedent again.... [T]he present dissenters' refusal to accept the validity and natural import of
decisions ... makes it difficult to engage in additional meaningful debate on the place of state
sovereign immunity in the Constitution." Id. at 643 (citations omitted).
9. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1759 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 1774 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
10. In Kimel, the four dissenters were willing to address only the question of Eleventh
Amendment immunity. 120 S. Ct. at 651 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Indeed, the dissenters stressed
that "the Seminole Tribe decision unnecessarily forces the Court to resolve vexing questions of
constitutional law respecting Congress' § 5 authority." Id. at 653. In Morrison, Justice Breyer,
joined by Justice Stevens, doubted "the Court's reasoning rejecting" congressional Section 5
power, 120 S. Ct. at 1778 (Breyer, J., dissenting), but he found it unnecessary to "answer the § 5
question, which I would leave for more thorough analysis if necessary on another occasion," id. at
1780. Justices Souter and Ginsburg did not address the Section 5 issue at all.
This same pattern held true in the Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997), which was the Court's first major opinion to address Section 5 power in almost twenty
years. In Boerne, all the Justices except Souter and Breyer concurred in the Court's conclusion
that Congress was without Section 5 power to enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
Justices Souter and Breyer did not reach the question. Only in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), were four Justices-
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer-willing to confront the Section 5 question directly and to
uphold an exercise of Section 5 power. At issue in Florida Prepaid was the Patent Remedy Act,
35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1994), which authorized suits for patent infringements against states.
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This silence is remarkable, yet explicable. Since the New Deal, the
Commerce Clause has shaped core understandings of the contours of
national power. In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court took the
consequential step of upholding the public accommodations provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on Commerce Clause grounds alone, despite
the fact that Congress had asserted authority to enact the legislation under
both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2
We have ever since grown habituated to the use of Commerce Clause
power to sustain federal antidiscrimination law, never definitively resolving
the shape and reach of Section 5 authority.
What might be called the "jurisdictional" compromise of the 1960s
was forged at a time when the Commerce Clause seemed to offer boundless
support for Congress's authority to enact antidiscrimination laws. But this
no longer appears to be the case. Given the Court's current determination to
impose limits on Congress's authority to enact antidiscrimination
legislation under the Commerce Clause, the time has come to examine
thoroughly, at long last, a question that the Court has now rendered
inescapable: the extent of Congress's power to enact antidiscrimination
legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A growing number of the Court's decisions 3 now claim authoritatively
to resolve this question within a framework that seeks to protect what the
Court regards as "vital principles necessary to maintain separation of
powers and the federal balance." '' These decisions are enormously
consequential. This past Term represents the first time since Reconstruction
that the Court has declared that Congress lacked power to enact legislation
prohibiting discrimination. Yet the impact of last Term's decisions is still
not clear. The decisions are rife with ambiguity. After Kimel, for example,
it is uncertain whether and to what extent Congress can exercise its power
under Section 5 to redress forms of discrimination that differ from those
that courts prohibit in cases arising under Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It is equally unclear after Morrison whether and to what
extent antidiscrimination legislation enacted under Section 5 can regulate
the conduct of private actors. Depending upon how Kimel and Morrison are
527 U.S. at 648 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Federal protection for patent property rights is, of course,
at some remove from the antidiscrimination values that historically lay at the heart of the
Fourteenth Amendment and its Section 5 enforcement power. See Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) ("Its aim was against discrimination because of race or color.").
11. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250-52 (1964) (reserving the
question of congressional power to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964 under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
12. Infra text accompanying note 22.
13. Other recent Section 5 cases (not involving the Equal Protection Clause) include Boerne,
521 U.S. 507, and Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627.
14. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
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interpreted in subsequent decisions, the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence
could develop in quite different directions.
Any hope of engaging the Court with regard to the premises of this
emerging Section 5 jurisprudence depends upon wrestling with the Court's
reasoning now, while this new body of doctrine is still taking shape in
ongoing litigation. We thus begin this Essay by analyzing Section 5
legislation within the framework advanced by the Court in its recent
decisions. We argue that neither separation-of-powers nor federalism
values require the kind of stringent judicial supervision of Section 5
antidiscrimination legislation that some interpretations of the Court's recent
decisions might be read to authorize. After analyzing Congress's Section 5
power within the terms of the Court's recent decisions, we conclude the
Essay by stepping outside the framework of these decisions. We question
the court-centered model of constitutional interpretation that these decisions
assume, examining the relationship between Court and Congress that
actually shaped the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause in recent
decades. We argue that this history justifies a continuing role for
democratic vindication of equality values.
The Essay is divided into four parts. In the first, we briefly set the stage
by describing the interlocking Supreme Court decisions that have brought
Congress's power to enact antidiscrimination legislation under Section 5 to
the top of the judicial agenda, while simultaneously rendering doubtful the
nature and extent of Congress's authority to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause.
In Part II, we examine the separation-of-powers constraints that the
Court has imposed on Section 5 power in the Kimel decision. Section 5
gives Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article," and the constitutional scope of Section 5
legislation therefore doubles back on the question of how "the provisions of
this article" are to be read. The Court apparently regards this peculiar
doubled structure as especially threatening to its authority to interpret the
Constitution, and it conceptualizes this question as an issue of separation of
powers.' 5 Kimel uses a test of "congruence and proportionality" to ensure
that congressional Section 5 legislation does not encroach on the Court's
prerogative to declare the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The test
15. The ultimate question concerns whether Congress has acted within the authority of its
enumerated powers. Some have viewed this as essentially a question of federalism. See, e.g.,
William Cohen, Congressional Power To Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 603 (1975); David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boeme v. Flores and
Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 40-44. But query
whether the values of federalism entirely exhaust the function "of the Court in keeping Congress
within the boundary of its enumerated powers." William W. Van Alstyne, The Failure of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 DUKE L.J.
291, 318 (1996).
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is intended to distinguish statutes that attempt to remedy violations of
Section 1 of the Amendment from those that attempt to redefine the
constitutional protections of that Section. While some lower courts have
begun to read Kimel as requiring that legislation enforcing the Equal
Protection Clause conform to the terms of the Court's cases judicially
enforcing the Clause, 6 we argue that, properly read, Kimel allows for
institutional variance in legislative and judicial enforcement of the Clause.
This approach is supported not only by the Court's reasoning in Kimel, but
also by the Court's reasoning in cases interpreting the equal protection
guarantee of Section 1.
If Kimel constrains Section 5 power to ensure that Congress's efforts to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause do not encroach on the prerogatives of
the Court, Morrison constrains Section 5 power to ensure that Congress's
efforts to enforce the Equal Protection Clause do not encroach on the
prerogatives of the states. In Part III we analyze how Morrison applies the
Court's "resurgent federalism" "7 to antidiscrimination legislation enacted
under Section 5. Since the days of Reconstruction, the Court has worried
that Section 5 might "authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law
for the regulation of private rights" that will displace "the domain of State
legislation." 8  Morrison provocatively appeals directly to these
Reconstruction-era perspectives. We subject Morrison to critical scrutiny,
examining its arguments and reasoning, and measuring its vision of
federalism against the historical development of the federal civil rights
tradition in the twentieth century. Although Morrison might be interpreted
as announcing a per se rule forbidding the use of Section 5 power to
regulate private parties, we argue that the decision is better read as
requiring a case-by-case determination of whether Section 5 legislation is
congruent and proportional to the constitutional violation it seeks to
remedy. We conclude Part HI by exploring whether federalism values
require restrictions on Section 5 antidiscrimination legislation that is
properly remedial within the meaning of Kimel.
However interpreted, the Court's decisions in Kimel and Morrison
impose new and substantial restrictions on Congress's power to enact
antidiscrimination laws under Section 5. This is because both decisions
conceive of the legitimacy of Section 5 power as ancillary to judicial
authority to enforce Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Part IV we
suggest that this framework of analysis misconceives how the constitutional
16. Infra note 108 and accompanying text.
17. Thomas W. Beimers, Searching for the Structural Vision of City of Boeme v. Flores:
Vertical and Horizontal Tensions in the New Constitutional Architecture, 26 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 789, 790 n.7 (1999).
18. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). For a contemporary statement of this
concern, see Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 287-88 (1993) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
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meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is established. We argue that the
framework is not required by either federalism or separation of powers, and
that it is inconsistent with the development of equal protection
jurisprudence in the decades after Brown v. Board of Education.19 Drawing
on the history recounted in Part III, we illustrate how the Court struggled
with the distinctive dilemmas of interpreting the Equal Protection Clause
during the founding decades of our modem antidiscrimination tradition and
responded by forging a relationship with Congress that cannot be
conceptualized within a framework that would require Section 5 legislation
to be narrowly tailored to judicial enforcement of Section 1.
In the aftermath of Brown, the Court invited Congress's participation in
vindicating equality norms, both because Congress could secure popular
acceptance of the Court's decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause
and because the representative branches of government were an important
resource for the Court as it struggled to learn from and speak to the
American people about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of "equal protection of the laws." In this era, the Court
established a relationship with Congress that was fluid and dynamic, and
that could not be adequately comprehended by mechanical criteria like
"congruence and proportionality." This institutional relationship enabled
the Court to interpret the Equal Protection Clause in a manner that was
attentive to evolving and contested social norms. The framework of the
Court's recent Section 5 decisions represents a fundamental break with the
forms of interaction that the Warren and Burger Courts cultivated with
Congress in this formative period of the modem antidiscrimination
tradition.
At stake in the framework of analysis advanced by Kimel and
Morrison, therefore, is the survival of the very institutional ecology in
which legal and social understandings of equality have provoked, inspired,
and shaped each other over the last four decades. Yet at no point in last
Term's cases did the Court identify or weigh the potential costs of
disrupting this ecology, which its newfound interest in limiting the ways
that Congress may enforce the Equal Protection Clause threatens to do.
Restricting the participation of the representative branches in enforcing the
Equal Protection Clause does not necessarily enhance the authority of the
Court or the Constitution and, we argue, may ultimately diminish the
authority of both.
This, then, is the largest set of concerns that animates the writing of this
Essay and that leads us to engage in a serious and sustained way the Court's
decisions in Kimel and Morrison. In order to evaluate the reach, rationale,
and likely consequences of the restrictions these cases impose on Section 5
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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power, we begin our story at a provisional beginning, in an effort to
understand how the question of Congress's Section 5 authority, so long
shrouded in mystery, has now become a focal point of Supreme Court
attention.
I. THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF SECTION 5
The history of federal antidiscrimination law in the twentieth century
features two momentous events. The first is Brown v. Board of Education,"
when the Supreme Court breathed new life into Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The second is the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2"
the first major federal antidiscrimination legislation enacted since 1875. In
debating and drafting the 1964 Act, Congress invoked its power under both
the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 But
when the Supreme Court came to determine the Act's constitutionality in
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, it shied away from a confrontation
with its own Section 5 precedents, which dated from the first
Reconstruction, and chose instead to build on the case law of the New Deal
settlement, which ceded very broad powers to Congress to legislate under
the Commerce Clause. It translated the question of congressional authority
into the relatively simple issue of whether "Congress had a rational basis
for finding that racial discrimination ... affected commerce."23
20. Id.
21. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971. 2000(a)
(1994)).
22. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201, 78 Stat. at 243. For example, the jurisdictional provisions
of Title II of the Act, which prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation, trace the
contours of both Section 5 and the Commerce Clause. The Act applies to a public accommodation
"if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State
action." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1994) (emphasis added). The Senate Report noted that the
Supreme Court had in 1883 in the Civil Rights Cases, struck down a closely analogous federal
statute that was based upon Section 5 power. But the Report explains:
There is a large body of legal thought that believes the Court would either reverse the
earlier decision if the question were again presented or that changed circumstances in
the intervening 80 years would make it possible for the earlier decision to be
distinguished. That question, however, was not before the committee, for the instant
measure is based on the commerce clause ... of the Constitution.
S. REP. No. 88-872, at 12 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2366. The House Report
said simply that "[a] number of provisions of the Constitution of the United States clearly supply
the means 'to secure these rights....' H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 18 (1963), reprinted in
1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393. For a full discussion of the legislative history, see DONALD G.
MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF RESPONSIBILITY 292-330 (1966),
which recounts in detail how Congress deliberated about the scope of its powers under the
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the public accommodations provisions
of the Civil Rights Act, and see also Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 292-
93 n.1 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring), which discusses the legislative history of the Act.
23. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258; see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304
(1964). In Heart of Atlanta, the Court stated:
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The decision fixed a fateful pattern. While Congress, in what might be
called a second Reconstruction,24 continued to invoke its powers to
enact antidiscrimination legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 5 Heart of Atlanta set a precedent that invited judicial
ratification of this legislation on alternative grounds, most notably on the
basis of the Commerce Clause.26 This pattern persisted during the
ensuing years,27 progressively obscuring the relationship of federal
antidiscrimination legislation to Section 5, even as Congress and the Court
continued to reason about antidiscrimination legislation as enforcing the
equality values of the Fourteenth Amendment." Over time, disparities
emerged between the requirements of federal antidiscrimination legislation
and the constitutional requirements that courts were willing to enforce
under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 But these differences were
not generally understood by the Court or others as constitutionally
Our study of the legislative record. has brought us to the conclusion that Congress
possessed ample power in this regard, and we have therefore not considered the other
grounds relied upon. This is not to say that the remaining authority upon which it acted
was not adequate, a question upon which we do not pass, but merely that since the
commerce power is sufficient for our decision here we have considered it alone.
Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 250. Justice Douglas, writing separately, observed that "the result
reached by the Court is for me much more obvious as a protective measure under the Fourteenth
Amendment than under the Commerce Clause. For the former deals with the constitutional status
of the individual not with the impact on commerce of local activities or vice versa." Id. at 279
(Douglas, J., concurring); see also id. at 291-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
24. See, e.g., MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM AND REBELLION: THE SECOND
RECONSTRUCTION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945-1990 (2d ed. 1991).
25. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1994);
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994); Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-259, § 2, 108 Stat. 694, 694; H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 19
(1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2154 (Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972); S. REP. NO. 90-721, at 7 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837, 1843 (Civil Rights
Act of 1968).
26. For examples of the Court refusing to reach the Section 5 question, see infra note 280.
27. There were, however, some notable exceptions. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445 (1976) (upholding that Congress had authority under Section 5 to extend Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to state employees).
28. Infra text accompanying notes 280-283.
29. There are, for example, discrepancies between the Court's treatment of pregnancy under
Title VII and its treatment of pregnancy under the Fourteenth Amendment. Compare Cal. Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284 (1987) (stating that the first clause of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment "add[s] pregnancy to the definition of sex discrimination
prohibited by Title VII"), and Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669, 684 (1983) ("The 1978 Act makes clear that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related
conditions less favorably than other medical conditions."), with Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,
496 n.20 (1974) ("While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that
every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification."). There are
also discrepancies between Title VII's requirements for proving discrimination and those of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (allowing
claims of discrimination in cases of disparate impact), with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976) (requiring plaintiffs alleging discrimination to prove that the state acted with
discriminatory purpose).
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problematic; they could always be accommodated by the broad authority of
the Commerce Clause.
Recently, however, three lines of decision have combined to disturb
this arrangement. First, the Court has signaled its intention to abrogate the
New Deal settlement and reassert judicial control over the scope of
Commerce Clause power. In United States v. Lopez,30 the Court struck
down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as exceeding Congress's
authority to regulate interstate commerce. In Morrison, the Court expanded
the logic of Lopez into the domain of federal civil rights law, holding that
42 U.S.C. § 13981, the provision of VAWA creating a federal civil remedy
for victims of gender-motivated violence, could not be sustained as an
exercise of Commerce Clause power.3' The Court stressed that the reach of
§ 13981 was not limited by any "jurisdictional element" connecting
federally regulated behavior to interstate commerce 32 and that § 13981
sought to assert federal control over "noneconomic activity"3 3 that was
peculiarly within an area "of traditional state regulation." 3 Despite
extensive congressional findings documenting the adverse effects of
gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce3'-findings far more
extensive than those that the Court had found adequate to sustain the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 in Heart of Atlanta 6-the Court ruled that upholding
this exercise of the commerce power over an activity that is not itself
"commercial" or "economic" in character would obliterate the
"distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local."37 If
§ 13981 were to be upheld as a constitutional exercise of congressional
power, therefore, it would have to be under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Lopez and Morrison impose uncertain restrictions on the use of the
commerce power. Although the present Court does not seem inclined to
attack Heart of Atlanta by holding that federal regulation of discrimination
in public accommodations or employment involves matters that are
"noneconomic" or "truly local," the Court has now begun to use criteria to
restrict Congress's power under the Commerce Clause that are indifferent
to the varying forms and settings in which discrimination occurs. The
Court's new Commerce Clause cases tend toward equating national power
with power to regulate "economic" events, activities, and transactions, a
category whose definition is not especially clear, but whose purpose seems
30. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
31. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1740-54 (2000).
32. Id. at 1751-52.
33. Id. at 1751.
34. Id. at 1753.
35. Id. at 1752.
36. Id. at 1763 (Souter, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 1754.
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to be to restrict Congress from enacting legislation that intrudes upon
"traditional" areas of state regulation, like education, the family, or the
criminal regulation of intrastate violence.38
Morrison dramatically illustrates how the Court's revived limitations
on the commerce power now materially constrict the effective scope of
federal antidiscrimination legislation. Because exercise of VAWA's civil
rights remedy would impose federal constraints on violence in the family,
the Court treats the law as interfering with "noneconomic" matters that,
from the standpoint of the Court's new Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
are "local," beyond the scope of legitimate national concern. From the
standpoint of Fourteenth Amendment values, however, there is no reason to
assume that sex discrimination in the administration of the criminal law is
outside federal regulatory concern, because the state's failure to enforce
prohibitions on assault in an evenhanded way leaves women unprotected
from attack by family members as well as by others. Discrimination in state
regulation of family life has no special immunity from the reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment.39 The Court's recent limitations on Congress's
powers under the Commerce Clause thus focus renewed attention on
Section 5 as an alternative source of constitutional authority, one adequate
to the task of combating discrimination in whatever social forms or settings
it happens to manifest itself.
This reinvigorated focus on Section 5 has been intensified by a second
line of recent decisions. In its 1996 opinion in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
n
4
the Court held that congressional legislation enacted pursuant to Article I
powers, such as the Commerce Clause, cannot abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment immunity of states, which "prevents congressional
authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States"41 in
federal courts. Two years later, in Alden v. Maine,42 the Court held that this
immunity also prohibited the federal government from subjecting
"nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts."4 3
The contours of Eleventh Amendment immunity are extremely
complex, but suffice it to say that the Amendment bars suits by private
parties that seek money or damages "resulting from a past breach of a legal
38. See id. at 1753-54; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,564 (1995).
39. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967); see infra text accompanying notes 291-293.
40. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
41. Id. at 72. For a good discussion of Seminole Tribe, see Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole
Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
42. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
43. Id. at 712. For a critique, see Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors
in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011 (2000).
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duty." Since large stretches of federal law are ordinarily enforced by
exactly such suits, it is fair to conclude that the "net result" of Seminole
Tribe and Alden will be "that Congress may regulate the states, but in the
end will lack the practical tools necessary to do so with maximum
effectiveness." 45  This would certainly be true of most federal
antidiscrimination law, which is normally enforced by private suits against
the states. In fact, federal antidiscrimination law that cannot be sustained as
an exercise of Section 5 power will probably be enforced against the states
primarily through the cumbersome and unwieldy interventions of federal
agencies.46
Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, can be abrogated by
legislation enacted "pursuant to Congress's § 5 power."47 The upshot is
that the scope of Section 5 power has now become the measure of what
federal antidiscrimination legislation may effectively be applied to the
states. The Court's evasion in Heart of Atlanta has thus come home to
roost. In the past thirty years, Congress has exercised its commerce
authority to develop a rich and complex jurisprudence of federal
antidiscrimination legislation, which is in many of its particulars in tension
with judicial enforcement of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
question of whether this law may properly be applied to the states will
depend upon how the Court chooses to conceptualize the relationship
between Section 5 and Section 1.
Much is at stake in this issue. So, for example, the Court has
interpreted Section 1 to require a showing of "discriminatory purpose" as a
44. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974). There are several important exceptions to
Eleventh Amendment immunity. The most significant is that it does not extend to the kinds of
"actions against state officers for injunctive or declaratory relief' that were approved in Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Alden, 527 U.S. at 757. For a discussion of this distinction, see
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986); and Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Night and Day: Coeur
d'Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh
Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1 (1998). Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply to
suits by the United States, nor does it "extend to suits prosecuted against a municipal corporation
or other governmental entity which is not an arm of the State." Alden, 527 U.S. at 755-56; see
also Conley v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 709 n.3 (7th Cir. 2000); Narin v. Lower
Merion Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 323, 331 n.6 (3d Cir. 2000); Horwitz v. Bd. of Educ., No. 98-C-6490,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8021, at *9-10 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 2000). Eleventh Amendment immunity
does not prohibit "a suit for money damages... prosecuted against a state officer in his
individual capacity for unconstitutional or wrongful conduct fairly attributable to the officer
himself, so long as the relief is sought not from the state treasury but from the officer personally."
Alden, 527 U.S. at 757. Eleventh Amendment immunity also may be waived. In a recent decision,
however, the Court suggested that there may be limits to Congress's authority to condition the
receipt of "federal funding" on the express waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Coll. Sav.
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687 (1999).
45. Meltzer, supra note 43, at 1026.
46. States cannot assert Eleventh Amendment immunity against the federal government.
Supra note 44.
47. Alden, 527 U.S. at 756; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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prerequisite for a judicial finding of constitutional invalidity,48 yet a
violation of Title VII can be established merely upon a showing of
"disparate impact." 49 In order to uphold the application of the disparate
impact standard of Title VII to a state, the Eleventh Circuit recently felt
itself obliged to reconcile these two standards by concluding that "although
the form of the disparate impact inquiry differs from that used in a case
challenging state action directly under the Fourteenth Amendment, the core
injury targeted by both methods of analysis remains the same: intentional
discrimination." '0
If the conclusion of the Eleventh Circuit were taken seriously, it would
suggest a fundamental reworking of an important area of Title VII
jurisprudence.5 We might then imagine Title VII divided between those
standards suitable for application to states, because duplicative of judicial
practice under Section 1, and those standards suitable for application to
private parties, because developed under the aegis of the Commerce Clause.
Or we might imagine an incremental judicial reworking of the body of Title
VII law so as to bring it into line with the constricted set of standards
constitutionally applicable to states. Neither alternative is attractive. They
can be avoided, however, only if we are able to distinguish congressional
power under Section 5 from judicially enforceable standards under
Section 1.
But it is just this possibility that appears to be threatened by the Court's
newly developing case law on the scope of Congress's powers under the
enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We are referring, of
course, to a third line of decisions, initiated by the Court's 1997 decision in
City of Boerne v. Flores,"2 holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 (RFRA)53 was not a constitutional exercise of Section 5
power.54 Boerne was the first significant decision explicitly to address the
scope of Section 5 in almost twenty years.
48. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Congress codified the disparate impact standard in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-76, which was meant to reverse the Supreme Court's interpretation of
Title VII in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
50. In re Employment Discrimination Litig. Against Alabama, 198 F.3d 1305, 1322 (11th
Cir. 1999).
51. We should add that it is not at all clear that the Eleventh Circuit meant for its own
conclusion to be taken seriously, for the court goes out of its way to emphasize the view that
disparate impact doctrine can be applied to the states without alteration. The question, however, is
whether this view is plausible or sustainable if "the core injury targeted" by such doctrine is truly
"intentional discrimination."
52. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
53. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4
(1994)).
54. The Court subsequently applied Boerne in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
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Congress enacted RFRA "in direct response" to the Court's decision in
Employment Division v. Smith," which had sharply constricted the
approach of Sherbert v. Verner56 by holding that constitutional rights of free
exercise of religion would not, for the most part, be violated by neutral,
generally applicable regulations of conduct.57 Congress disagreed and
passed RFRA "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in
Sherbert v. Verner... and to guarantee its application in all cases where
free exercise of religion is substantially burdened." 58 RFRA was justified as
an exercise of Congress's Section 5 power "to enforce" First Amendment
free exercise rights as incorporated in the Due Process Clause of Section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment.59
In Boerne, the Court declared that Congress lacked power under
Section 5 to enact RFRA. It began its analysis by observing "that § 5 is 'a
positive grant of legislative power' to Congress" 60 and that its "scope" was
therefore to be interpreted in "broad terms." 6' Reaffirming Katzenbach v.
Morgan,62 the Court stated that "[i]t is for Congress in the first instance to
'determin[e] whether and what legislation is needed to secure the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,' and its conclusions are entitled
to much deference."' 63 But the Court then distinguished between the power
"to enforce" the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and "the power
to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation." 64 It held that
Section 5 authorized the former, but not the latter:
Congress's power under § 5 ... extends only to "enforc[ing]" the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has described
this power as "remedial[.]" The design of the Amendment and the
text of § 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has
the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's
restrictions on the States. Legislation which alters the meaning of
the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause.
Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what
the right is.
65
55. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512 (discussing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
56. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
57. For a summary of the relevant holding of Smith, see Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512-14.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994).
59. RFRA applied "to all Federal and State law, and the implementation of that law, whether
statutory or otherwise." Id. § 2000bb-3(a).
60. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)).
61. id.
62. 384 U.S. 641.
63. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (quoting Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651).
64. Id. at 519.
65. Id. (first alteration in original) (citation omitted). This distinction and holding were aimed
at the alternate holding of Morgan, which seemed to cede to Congress the power independently to
interpret the meaning of Section 1. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527-29; Robert A. Burt, Miranda and
2000]
The Yale Law Journal
The Court initially argued that maintaining the distinction between the
power to remedy constitutional violations and the power to determine the
nature of constitutional rights was necessary in order to preserve the
supremacy of the Constitution. "If Congress could define its own powers
by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the
Constitution be 'superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.'
It would be 'on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other
acts.... alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.' 
66
But because the Constitution remains "superior, paramount law"
whether interpreted by the Court or by Congress, so long as either
institution chooses to regard it as such, what really seems to be at stake for
the Court in the distinction between remedial and substantive legislation is
the preservation of judicial control over the ultimate meaning of the
Constitution, at least in the context of cases properly litigated before the
Court. In Boerne, the Court was plainly provoked by Congress's openly
expressed purpose to nullify the Court's own interpretation of the First
Amendment in Smith.67 RFRA posed a direct challenge to the Court's
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, a challenge that the Court was
determined to resist:
When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within
the province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say
what the law is.... When the political branches of the Government
act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the
Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases
and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect
due them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and
contrary expectations must be disappointed.... [I]t is this Court's
precedent, not RFRA, which must control.6"
Boerne thus reasserts the basic precept of Marbury: In the last instance, it is
for "the Judicial Branch. . . to say what the law is." 69
Boerne frankly concedes that "the line between measures that remedy
or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive
change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and [that] Congress must
Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SUP. CT. REv. 81, 83-84. For a discussion of the literature,
see Gary C. Leedes, State Action Limitations on Courts and Congressional Power, 60 N.C.
L. REv. 747, 778-82 (1982); and Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of the Red Herrings: A
Defense of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 589 (1996).
66. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
67. See supra text accompanying note 58 (quoting RFRA's statement of purpose).
68. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
69. Id.
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have wide latitude in determining where it lies." 7o But in a context in which
"common sense" suggested that RFRA was "a congressional effort to
overrule the Supreme Court on a point of constitutional interpretation,"71
the Court insisted that the line "exists and must be observed." 72
To ensure that Congress would not exceed its legitimate powers under
the Fourteenth Amendment, Boerne proposed that the line be discerned by a
test of "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented
or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection,
legislation may become substantive in operation and effect."73 The Court
concluded that:
RFRA cannot be considered remedial, preventive legislation, if
those terms are to have any meaning. RFRA is so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a
substantive change in constitutional protections."
The Court's new interest in constraining Section 5 power, when
considered in light of the developments in Commerce Clause and Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence we have just discussed, raises disconcerting
questions for the future of federal antidiscrimination law. Limitations on
Commerce Clause power, imposed in the name of federalism by Lopez and
Seminole Tribe, have reemphasized the importance of congressional
Section 5 power, while Boerne has simultaneously imposed a new and
uncertain restriction on the nature of that power. When the 1999 Term
began, the Court had not yet applied either its resurgent federalism or its
intensified solicitude for separation of powers to federal antidiscrimination
legislation. But this restraint ended in January 2000, when Kimel held that
Congress was without power under Section 5 to enact the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). 5 Five months later,
Morrison held that Congress was without power under either the Commerce
Clause or Section 5 to create in VAWA a civil cause of action for victims
of gender-motivated violence.
70. Id. at 519-20.
71. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 469 (1994); id. at 473 ("That is what RFRA's
supporters wanted, and that is what they got."); see also Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and
the Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REV. 145, 153 (1995).
72. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 532.
75. The ADEA retains its force, of course, as a valid exercise of the commerce power. It is
thus fully applicable to private parties and to cities, and it is enforceable against states by the
federal government. See supra note 44.
2000]
The Yale Law Journal
In the next Part of this Essay we examine how Kimel applies the
separation-of-powers concerns of Boerne to Congress's power to enact
remedial antidiscrimination legislation under Section 5. In the Part that
follows, we evaluate Morrison's use of federalism to restrict otherwise
properly remedial exercises of Section 5 power. To do so, we offer a brief
history of the development of our modern antidiscrimination tradition. In
Part IV we deploy this history to raise more fundamental questions about
whether the model of constitutional interpretation on which Boerne rests is
appropriate for reasoning about legislative or judicial enforcement of the
Equal Protection Clause.
II. KIMEL AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
The question for decision in Kimel was whether the ADEA could be
enforced against states in private suits for damages and back pay. Congress
had extended the protections of the ADEA to state and federal employees in
1974,76 and the Court thereafter upheld the statute in EEOC v. Wyoming77 as
"a valid exercise of Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause."78 But
in 1996 the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe interposed Eleventh
Amendment immunity as a bar to such suits unless the ADEA could be
upheld as a valid exercise of Section 5 power.79
The ADEA stringently regulates age-based discrimination. Under
accepted equal protection doctrine, by contrast, courts use a lenient
"rational basis" standard to scrutinize age-based classifications. ° The
question in Kimel was whether Congress could adopt age discrimination
legislation under Section 5 whose liability rules differed from those that the
Court was willing to apply in its own enforcement of Section 1.
Kimel adopts Boerne's framing of this issue. Like Boerne, it begins
with the proposition that the exercise of congressional Section 5 power is
"entitled to much deference." 8' Like Boerne, Kimel distinguishes between
remedial and substantive power, and it invokes the "congruence and
proportionality" test to separate one from the other.82 "Our task," Kimel
76. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 74.
77. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
78. Id. at 243. The Court added: "We need not decide whether it could also be upheld as an
exercise of Congress's powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.; see also Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 468-70 (1991) (discussing EEOC, 460 U.S. 226); EEOC, 460 U.S. at 234
& n.6 (listing district court opinions that had upheld the extension "as an exercise of Congress'
power under either the Commerce Clause or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment").
79. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented in Kimel on the grounds that
Seminole Tribe was wrongly decided. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 653 (2000)
(Stevens, I., dissenting); see also supra notes 8, 10.
80. See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470-71; Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
81. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 644 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997)).
82. Id.
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states, "is to determine whether the ADEA is in fact... an appropriate
remedy or, instead, merely an attempt to substantively redefine the States'
legal obligations with respect to age discrimination."83
The difficulty, however, is that neither Boerne nor Kimel ever clearly
explains the distinction between remedial and substantive legislation.' The
Court appears to believe that substantive legislation seeks to define the
"unconstitutional behavior" that is prohibited by the Constitution, whereas
remedial legislation purports instead to be "instrumentally useful" in
preventing or deterring behavior that is otherwise properly defined as
unconstitutional." Boerne proposes the congruence and proportionality test
as a means of identifying the "basic aims" of Section 5 legislation.86
Legislation "designed to" remedy "unconstitutional behavior" is within
the scope of Section 5, whereas laws that "attempt a substantive change in
constitutional protections" are not.87 The function of the Boerne test, the
Court has explained, is to ensure "that the object of valid § 5 legislation
must be the carefully delimited remediation or prevention of constitutional
violations." 88
Insofar as the point of the Boerne test is to distinguish substantive from
remedial legislation, its basic thrust, in 'the words of Chief Justice
Marshall's venerable opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland,89 is to ascertain
whether "congress, under the pretext of executing its powers," has passed
"laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the
government." " The test ultimately seeks to ascertain congressional intent;"
it does not purport to restrict congressional power that is exercised for a
proper purpose. This clarifies why Boerne could propose the congruence
and proportionality test while simultaneously asserting that congressional
83. Id. at 648.
84. For a discussion of the difficulties of this distinction, see, for example, Douglas Laycock,
Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boeme v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 767-70 (1998).
85. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and Religious
Liberty After City of Boeme v. Flores, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 87-88.
86. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647
(1999); see also Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 645 (applying the test).
87. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
88. Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672
(1999) (emphasis added).
89. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
90. Id. at 423.
91. For example, in Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, the Court applied Boerne's
congruence and proportionality test to determine whether Congress's abrogation of state sovereign
immunity from patent claims was intended to remedy potential due process violations, or instead
whether "[t]he statute's apparent and more basic aims were to provide a uniform remedy for
patent infringement and to place States on the same footing as private parties under that regime."
527 U.S. at 647-48. The Court noted that although the latter purposes "are proper Article I
concerns," Article I "does not give Congress the power" to abrogate state sovereign immunity.
Id. at 648.
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"conclusions" about the necessary scope of proper Section 5 legislation
"are entitled to much deference." 92
On this account, however, the Boerne test is ambiguous with respect to
two fundamental questions. First, Boerne asks courts to determine whether
Section 5 legislation is congruent and proportional to the goal of remedying
or deterring violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet Boerne does not
specify what should count as equal protection violations for purposes of
applying the test, an ambiguity of immense practical significance in a
decision like Kimel. In this Part of our Essay, we analyze Kimel's
application of the congruence and proportionality test to explore the nature
of the equal protection violations that, consistent with Boerne's concern to
preserve judicial authority "to say what the law is," Congress can be
empowered to deter or remedy by exercise of its Section 5 power. At stake
in this question is whether legislative and judicial enforcement of the Equal
Protection Clause may vary.
Second, the Boerne test never specifies how much congruence and
proportionality is constitutionally necessary. Boerne's requirement that
Section 5 legislation have "the object" of enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment implies, of course, that there must be some relationship
between the legislation and the goal of remedying or deterring violations of
the Equal Protection Clause. But Boerne gives little or no guidance about
how tight a fit a court should require between congressional legislation and
the Court's own enforcement of Section 1. Presumably the degree of
congruence and proportionality required of Section 5 legislation will
depend on the constitutional values potentially compromised by that
legislation. Boerne and Kimel each explain their use of the test by reference
to only one such value, which is the need of the Court to retain control over
the articulation of "what the law is." This would suggest that Section 5
legislation need possess only so much congruence and proportionality as to
render it plausible that the legislation was enacted for a purpose approved
by the Court.93 The congruence and proportionality requirement might be
92. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. As Chief Justice Marshall went on to say in McCulloch,
But where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects
intrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire into the decree of its necessity,
would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on
legislative ground. This court disclaims all pretensions to such a power.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
93. In both Boerne and Kimel, the Court was prepared to accord Congress a good deal of
leeway in order to achieve permissible ends. Thus Boerne explicitly reaffirmed the basic principle
of Section 5 jurisprudence that properly remedial congressional legislation can prohibit "conduct
which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously
reserved to the States."' Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (citations omitted). Boerne went out of its way
to approve earlier relevant precedents, like City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980),
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), and
even Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), in which the Court had interpreted "the sweep
of Congress's enforcement power" under the Reconstruction Amendments to extend considerably
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stricter, however, if the Boerne test were to be used as a vehicle for the
protection of other constitutional values, such as federalism. We discuss
these issues in Part IV after we have considered the question of federalism
in the context of the Morrison case.
A. Applying the Boeme Test to Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation
To determine whether Section 5 legislation is congruent and
proportional to the goal of remedying or deterring violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment, one must first identify the class of violations that
Congress is empowered to remedy or deter. The Kimel opinion itself is
highly equivocal in this regard.
Kimel begins by focusing on the category of age within the Court's own
equal protection jurisprudence. When courts review claims of age
discrimination in equal protection cases arising under Section 1, they
employ rational basis review. Rational basis scrutiny means "States may
discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth
Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest."'94 The statutory requirements of the ADEA,
however, effectively elevate "the standard for analyzing age discrimination
to heightened scrutiny."95 Kimel stresses this disparity in the first half of its
opinion, noting that the ADEA "prohibits substantially more state
employment decisions and practices than would likely be held
unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis
standard."96 This half of the opinion ends with the conclusion that "the
ADEA is 'so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object
beyond the bounds of what a court might find to violate these Amendments. Boeme, 521 U.S.
at 518. Kimel agreed that
Congress' § 5 power is not confined to the enactment of legislation that merely parrots
the precise wording of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, Congress' power "to
enforce" the Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to deter violation
of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct,
including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text.
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 644 (2000) (citations omitted). Kimel recognized
that the Constitution does not preclude "Congress from enacting reasonably prophylactic
legislation." Id. at 648. When acting remedially for an objective properly within the scope of
Section 5 power, therefore, Congress can regulate otherwise constitutional behavior for
the instrumental purpose of protecting constitutional rights. It can act both to
"prevent... constitutional violations," Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535, and to "deter[]" them, id. at
518. It follows from these conclusions that Section 5 legislation will frequently be neither tightly
congruent nor proportional to whatever baseline definition of a constitutional violation the Court
is prepared to require.
94. Kinel, 120 S. Ct. at 646.
95. Id. at 648.
96. Id. at 647.
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that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior.'
Although this would appear to end the matter, Kimel promptly launches
into a second analysis by flatly asserting that this disproportionality is not
actually dispositive. The fact that "the ADEA prohibits very little conduct
likely to be held unconstitutional, while significant, does not alone provide
the answer to our § 5 inquiry." 98 That answer, apparently, can come only
from an independent review of the legislative history of the ADEA. In this
half of its analysis, Kimel performs something much closer to an ordinary
judicial inquiry into legislative intent. It reviews the evidence before
Congress to determine whether Congress had intended to enact remedial or
substantive legislation. Only after finding that "Congress had virtually no
reason to believe that state and local governments were unconstitutionally
discriminating against their employees on the basis of age,"99 and that
Congress therefore "had no reason to believe that broad prophylactic
legislation was necessary in this field," does Kimel ultimately conclude that
the ADEA is "not a valid exercise of Congress's power under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 100
The two halves of Kimel's analysis correspond to two distinct
understandings of the Boerne test. Kimel first asks whether the prohibitions
of the ADEA are congruent and proportional to the goal of remedying or
deterring "state employment decisions and practices [that] would likely be
held unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis
standard."101 It interprets the test as assessing the congruence and
proportionality of the ADEA to the goal of remedying or deterring conduct
that in litigation a court would hold in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. In the second half of its analysis, however, Kimel seems to
probe congressional intent to ask whether Congress believed that the
regulations of the ADEA were necessary to combat "unconstitutional
discrimination. '"1"2 Insofar as this inquiry can be translated into the
technical terms of the Boerne test, it focuses on the question of whether the
97. Id. (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532).
98. Id. at 648. The Court continued:
Difficult and intractable problems often require powerful remedies, and we have never
held that § 5 precludes Congress from enacting reasonably prophylactic legislation. Our
task is to determine whether the ADEA is in fact just such an appropriate remedy or,
instead, merely an attempt to substantively redefine the States' legal obligations with
respect to age discrimination. One means by which we have made such a determination
in the past is by examining the legislative record containing the reasons for Congress's
action.
Id.
99. Id. at 649.
100. Id. at 650.
101. Id. at 647.
102. Id. at 650.
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ADEA is congruent and proportional to the goal of remedying or deterring
conduct that would violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court in Boerne was so plainly provoked by Congress's expressed
desire to "make a substantive change in the governing law" 103 that it barely
paused to consider the distinction between these two interpretations of its
own test."° Yet the difference is of great practical and theoretical
importance. Kimel's first interpretation of the Boerne test is quite harsh.
Rational basis review is highly permissive. "[Aibsent some reason to infer
antipathy," "' it requires those who challenge a legislative classification to
"carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable
basis, but is essentially arbitrary., 106 Rational basis review requires
plaintiffs to "convince the court that the legislative facts on which the
classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be
true by the governmental decisionmaker."' 07 Courts using rational basis
review therefore only rarely find constitutional violations.
If the exercise of congressional Section 5 power must be congruent and
proportional to behavior that a court would hold unconstitutional under
rational basis review, virtually all antidiscrimination legislation, except that
protecting racial minorities and women, will be rendered beyond
Congress's Section 5 power. Some lower courts are in fact already
beginning to interpret Kimel in this unforgiving way:
On the question whether a statute.. . enforces the Fourteenth
Amendment, Kimel establishes two principal propositions. First,
because the rational-basis test applies to age discrimination, almost
all of the ADEA's requirements stand apart from the Constitution's
rule. Most age discrimination is rational, and therefore
constitutional, yet the Act forbids it. The ADEA therefore does not
"enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, there is no need for
prophylactic rules to catch evasions of the rational-basis test by
state governments. Congress did not find that such a problem
exists, and there is no evidence of one. The ADEA therefore cannot
be understood as enforcement legislation." 8
It is important to bear in mind, therefore, that Kimel itself, in the second
half of its analysis, offers an alternative interpretation of the Boerne test-
103. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
104. For a careful consideration of this issue, see Cole, supra note 15, at 59-71; and Michael
W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boeme v. Flores, 11l HARV.
L. REv. 153, 189-92 (1997).
105. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,97 (1979).
106. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 79 (1911).
107. Vance, 440 U.S. at 111.
108. Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d 945, 948-49 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted);
see also Kazmier v. United States, 225 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2000); Cooley v. Miss. Dep't of
Transp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 565, 566-67 (S.D. Miss. 2000).
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one that comports far more comfortably with both the stated purpose of the
Boerne test and with the Court's own equal protection jurisprudence.
In the second half of its analysis, Kimel asks whether the regulations of
the ADEA are congruent and proportional to the task of remedying or
deterring "unconstitutional discrimination." '09 This version of the Boerne
test does not ask whether Section 5 legislation remedies or deters conduct
that a court in adjudication would find unconstitutional, but instead asks
whether Section 5 legislation remedies or deters conduct that is
unconstitutional. We are so accustomed to thinking about courts as the sole
venue within which constitutionality is determined that it may require
imaginative effort to keep these two different accounts of the Boerne test
analytically distinct. But they are actually quite different from each other,
and rational basis review is an excellent context in which to grasp the
discrepancy between the two.
Rational basis review establishes a procedural framework to guide
courts in adjudicating certain claims of unconstitutional state action."' The
Court has explicitly recognized that this framework embodies "a paradigm
of judicial restraint.""' As the Court carefully explained in its very first
case addressing age-based discrimination, "action by a legislature is
presumed to be valid" when courts employ "the rational-basis standard."" 2
To presume that state action is valid is not to find it so; it is instead to
allocate the burden of proof for deciding the ultimate question of
constitutionality.
In the context of rational basis review, the ultimate question of
constitutionality will frequently turn on the presence vel non of what the
Court has termed "invidious discrimination." "3 It is black-letter law that
the Equal Protection Clause secures "'every person within the State's
109. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 650 (2000).
110. Of course, the procedures for judicial decisionmaking embodied in rational basis review
also reflect substantive judicial judgments about the kinds of state decisions that are likely to
reflect invidious discrimination, as well as about the meaning of invidious discrimination in
particular contexts. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 126. These procedures also reflect
understandings about the limited competence of courts to enforce Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See infra text accompanying notes 122-123.
111. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993).
112. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976); see also Beach
Communications, 508 U.S. at 314-15 ("On rational-basis review, a classification in a
statute... comes to us bearing a strong presumption of validity. . . .and those attacking the
rationality of the legislative classification have the burden 'to negative every conceivable basis
which might support it."'); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) ("State legislatures are presumed to have acted within
their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it.").
113. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) ("The prohibition of the Equal
Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination.").
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jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination."' 1"4 Intentional
discrimination-whether "invidious," ' ,, hostile or oppressive," 1 or "a
mere excuse for. . . the oppression, or spoliation of a particular class" "i-
is constitutionally prohibited:
Since Barbier v. Connolly, the Court's equal protection cases have
recognized a distinction between "invidious discrimination[]"-
i.e., classifications drawn "with an evil eye and an unequal hand"
or motivated by "a feeling of antipathy" against, a specific group
of residents, Yick Wo v. Hopkins ... -and those special rules that
"are often necessary for general benefits [such as] supplying water,
preventing fires, lighting districts, cleaning streets, opening parks,
and many other objects." '18
Long before equal protection doctrine had developed categories of suspect
classifications or oriented itself toward the protection of specific groups, it
had settled on the conclusion that state decisions must be justifiable by
reference to public reasons, so that government action that flows merely
from "antipathy" 119 or "animus" 120 is unconstitutional, whether or not it is
subject to rational basis review.121
The doctrine of rational basis review specifies the "judicial restraint"
that courts should exercise in responding to claims of invidious
discrimination. The Court has offered various reasons to explain this
judicial restraint. Sometimes the Court has attributed it to a proper
deference to legislative factfinding. "Since the members of a legislature
necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local conditions which this Court
cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by
the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and
oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes." 122
Sometimes the Court has attributed its restraint to judicial reluctance to
assume "a legislative role ... for which the Court lacks both authority and
competence." 2 '
114. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1075 (2000) (quoting Sioux City Bridge
Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441,445 (1923)).
115. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976); Weinberger v. Salti, 422 U.S. 749,
770 (1975); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 82 (1911).
116. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146 (1938).
117. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898).
118. N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 n.40 (1979) (citations omitted).
119. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
120. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
121. See, e.g., id. at 620; Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2000).
122. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940); see also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S.
439, 451-52 (1991) (quoting Madden, 309 U.S. at 87-88).
123. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31 (1973).
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It is noteworthy that these explanations do not in any way purport to
define the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. They instead identify a
variety of restraints on the institutional competence of courts to review
democratic lawmaking. If courts are too aggressive in searching out
invidious discrimination, they might exceed their factfinding capabilities or
improperly assume the role of a "super-legislature." '24 These cautions do
not apply to Congress, however, which is a perfectly legitimate legislature
capable of making broad factual findings. Nothing in the justification of
rational basis review constrains Congress from exercising its own
institutional prerogatives to undertake legislative factfinding to determine
whether there is invidious discrimination in any given area of national life.
The Court has explained that the judiciary itself will assume the
responsibility of such aggressive review, marked by a heightened scrutiny
that shifts the burden of proof onto the state, only in circumstances where
there is a sufficiently great likelihood of "prejudice and antipathy" to
warrant the expenditure of judicial resources and the intrusion on
democratic decisionmaking:125
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
commands that no State shall "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws," which is essentially a
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated
alike .... Section 5 of the Amendment empowers Congress to
enforce this mandate, but absent controlling congressional
direction, the courts have themselves devised standards for
determining the validity of state legislation or other official action
that is challenged as denying equal protection. The general rule is
that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest....
The general rule gives way, however, when a statute classifies
by race, alienage, or national origin. These factors are so seldom
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws
grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice
and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as
worthy or deserving as others....
Legislative classifications based on gender also call for a
heightened standard of review. That factor generally provides no
sensible ground for differential treatment. "[W]hat differentiates
sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical
disability... is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society .... "
124. Id. (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
125. See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) ("Certain
classifications ... in themselves supply a reason to infer antipathy. Race is the paradigm." ).
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We have declined, however, to extend heightened review to
differential treatment based on age .... [W]here individuals in the
group affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant
to interests the State has the authority to implement, the courts have
been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system.., to
closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how, and to
what extent those interests should be pursued.126
It is clear, therefore, that rational basis review marks the site of a gap
between conduct that the Court in principle recognizes might be
unconstitutional and conduct that the Court is willing in adjudication to
hold unconstitutional.127 When asked to pronounce on the constitutionality
of democratically legitimate state action, courts are subject to a variety of
institutional constraints, which are reflected in the severe "judicial
restraint" of rational basis review. These institutional constraints, however,
do not affect Congress's competency to fill the gap by using Section 5
power to remedy the invidious discrimination that the Court itself has held
violates the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause.
This analysis supplies a basis on which we can decide which of Kimel' s
two versions of the Boerne test better fulfills what Kimel itself describes as
the primary function of the congruence and proportionality test, which is to
ensure that the "ultimate interpretation and determination of the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive meaning" remain within "the province of the
Judicial Branch." 12 This function is fulfilled so long as Congress seeks to
remedy conduct that the Court recognizes as violating the Equal Protection
Clause. Although the "judicial restraint" of rational basis review prevents
courts from regulating the full extent of such conduct, that is no reason to
use the congruence and proportionality test to confine Congress to
regulating conduct that a court would likely hold in litigation to violate the
Equal Protection Clause. The more plausible reading of the test is Kimel's
second version, which asks whether Section 5 legislation is congruent and
proportional to the task of remedying "unconstitutional discrimination."29
Kimel thus quite rightly moves beyond the first half of its analysis by
asking whether Congress could have had any "reason to believe that state
and local governments were unconstitutionally discriminating against their
employees on the basis of age." "0
126. City of Clebume v, Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985) (emphasis
added).
127. See Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L. REv.
311,318-26 (1987).
128. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 644 (2000). For a discussion of other
possible values served by the Boerne test, see infra Part IV.
129. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 650.
130. Id. at 649.
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We might better grasp the fundamental and practical distinction
between these two interpretations of the congruence and proportionality test
if we consider a hypothetical federal statute that forbids discrimination
based upon sexual orientation. To date, the Court has applied only rational
basis review to classifications based on sexual orientation. Yet today there
is widespread animus against gays and lesbians in the United States,"' and
state action based on animus is unconstitutional.
32
If a court were to ask whether a federal statute forbidding sexual
orientation discrimination was congruent and proportional to state
"decisions and practices that would likely be held unconstitutional under
the applicable equal protection, rational basis standard," 13 which is Kimel's
first interpretation of the Boerne test, the statute would probably be held
beyond the Section 5 power of Congress. But this conclusion might be
different if a court were instead to ask whether the statute was congruent
and proportional to "unconstitutional discrimination," '34 which is the
question that Kimel poses in its second version of the Boerne test. A
sufficiently developed legislative record might well reveal enough animus
against gays and lesbians to render a federal prohibition of sexual
131. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2477-78 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
132. In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996), the Court employed rational basis review
to analyze the constitutionality of an amendment to the Colorado Constitution, yet invalidated the
state law on the grounds that "the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus
toward" homosexuals. In this respect, Romer resembles City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), where the Court, employing rational basis review, invalidated a
permit requirement on the grounds that it "appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against
the mentally retarded." Id. at 450.
Although in the vast majority of cases, courts applying rational basis review to state action
challenged as discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation have upheld the regulatory
practice, lower courts since Romer have been more inclined to follow the Court's lead and
scrutinize challenged practices for unconstitutional animus, even when applying rational basis
review. There are a number of recent examples of courts finding that governmental action
motivated by animus fails rational basis review. See, e.g., Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d
856, 874 (6th Cir. 1997) (" [I]t didn't take Romer to tell us that... arbitrary state action is
contrary to the principle of equal protection of the laws."); Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F.
Supp. 2d 1279, 1289 (D. Utah 1998) (granting summary judgment for a plaintiff who was fired as
a volleyball coach due to her sexual orientation "[b]ecause a community's animus towards
homosexuals can never serve as a legitimate basis for state action"); Glover v. Williamsburg
Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1174 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (finding that a school
board violated the Equal Protection Clause when it refused to renew the plaintiffs teaching
contract on account of his sexual orientation, because "the Board's decision was motivated by
animus toward him as a homosexual"); Dali v. Sec'y of the U.S. Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1335
(E.D. Cal. 1993) (finding that, "[e]ven under the rational basis standard," the Navy's policies
excluding homosexuals violated the Equal Protection Clause).
133. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 647.
134. Id. at 650.
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orientation discrimination a "reasonably prophylactic" 35 remedial measure
within Congress's Section 5 power. 36
B. Separation of Powers and the Enforcement Gap
The ambiguity in the ways that Kimel applies Boerne's congruence and
proportionality test arises because there is a significant gap between
conduct that will be found unconstitutional under standards and procedures
that courts have devised for use in adjudicatory proceedings, and conduct
that might be found unconstitutional by a factfinder applying judicial
standards but not subject to the same institutional constraints as courts.
Because the considerations of "judicial restraint" that shape and guide
rational basis review are specifically designed to prevent courts from
intruding on legislative discretion, they ought not to prevent Congress from
applying the prohibition against invidious discrimination in a procedurally
different and more comprehensive way than a court.
As our inquiry into the rational basis standard suggests, courts regularly
consider the constraints of their institutional position in the course of
crafting doctrine to govern adjudication of claims arising under the
Constitution. As a consequence, courts often adopt liability rules to govern
constitutional litigation that do not reflect the full range of meanings that
the Constitution's text might reasonably be understood to embody.
This discrepancy illustrates what Lawrence Sager has termed the
"underenforcement of the equal protection clause by the federal courts." 
37
When doctrines the Court has crafted to guide adjudication under the
Equal Protection Clause are defined in light of concerns about the
institutional capacities and legitimacy of courts, there exists the possibility
of an enforcement gap and therefore of an ambiguity in the application of
the Boerne test. It is relatively easy to analyze the implications of the
135. Id. at 648.
136. Some lower courts are now beginning to pursue this line of analysis in order to
distinguish Congress's Section 5 power to enact the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994), from Congress's Section 5 power to enact the ADEA.
Although current doctrine applies rational basis review to both age and disability, these courts
stress that "[t]he Kimel Court found that older persons have not suffered from systematic, historic
discrimination and that the group protected by the ADEA... is not a discrete and insular
minority.... By contrast, the ADA's legislative findings and record make clear the history of
purposeful, pervasive discrimination against persons with disabilities." Lewis v. N.M. Dep't of
Health, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1228 (D.N.M. 2000); see also Davis v. Utah State Tax Comnm'n,
96 F. Supp. 2d 1271, t282-84 (D. Utah 2000). The Court has granted a writ of certiorari in
Garrett v. University of Alabama at Birmingham Board of Trustees, 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir.
1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1669 (2000) (No. 99-1240), to decide this question.
137. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1218 (1978); see also Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain
Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 433-34
(1993) [hereinafter Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes].
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enforcement gap in Kimel for the proper application of the Boerne test,
because so long as Section 5 legislation enforces authoritative judicial
interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause, the "ultimate interpretation
and determination of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive meaning"
will remain "the province of the Judicial Branch." '
Enforcement gaps can occur in various forms and guises, however, and
sometimes the implications for interpreting the Boerne test are not as clear
as in this case. In the remainder of this Part, we consider a distinct kind of
enforcement gap that arises when the Court interprets a constitutional
provision in such a way as to suggest that a legislature may apply different
constitutional standards than courts.13 9 A good example of this kind of
enforcement gap may be the line of cases that the Court decided in the late
1970s holding that a showing of disparate impact disadvantaging minorities
or women is insufficient to make out a judicially remediable equal
protection violation, because "purposeful discrimination is 'the condition
that offends the Constitution."' 140 It is black-letter doctrine that courts will
apply rational basis review to facially neutral rules, unless it can be shown
that these rules have a "discriminatory purpose" ;14 that is, unless it can be
shown that "the decisionmaker... selected or reaffirmed a particular
course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group." 
14 2
In adopting this interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court
overruled a considerable number of lower court decisions holding "that the
substantially disproportionate racial impact of a statute or official practice
standing alone and without regard to discriminatory purpose, suffices to
prove racial discrimination absent some justification going substantially
beyond what would be necessary to validate most other legislative
classifications.'143 The Court freely conceded that these decisions
"impressively demonstrate that there is another side to the issue," 144 but it
138. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 644.
139. The political question doctrine represents a simple form of this kind of
underenforcement gap. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (" Prominent on the surface
of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department ....").
140. Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).
141. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
142. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
143. Davis, 426 U.S. at 244. The Court would later concede that the doctrine of
discriminatory purpose was contradicted by "some contrary indications ... from some of our
cases." Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 & n.10 (1977)
(citing Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1972); Palmer v. Thompson,
403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-86 (1968)). For an account
that situates the Court's interpretive choices in larger historical perspective, see Reva B. Siegel,
Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status.Enforcing State Action,
49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1129-48 (1997).
144. Davis, 426 U.S. at 245.
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nevertheless insisted that a court must find discriminatory purpose before it
could hold a facially neutral statute in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Any other conclusion, the Court said, would involve a "more
probing judicial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable
acts of administrators and executives than is appropriate under the
Constitution." 145 Extension of the disparate impact rule "beyond those
areas where it is already applicable by reason of statute.., should await
legislative prescription." 46 -
The doctrine of discriminatory purpose appears to set forth a clear
liability rule, defining what does and does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause. But this clarity dissipates on close inspection. Like rational basis
review, the doctrine of discriminatory purpose is not justified by the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, but by reference to the
particular institutional limitations of the Court as a nonrepresentative body
within a democracy. 47 "The calculus of effect," the Court observes in
justification of its rule, "is a legislative and not a judicial responsibility." 148
The Court does not say that discriminatory impact violates the Equal
Protection Clause; neither does it say that only discriminatory purpose
violates the Equal Protection Clause. Instead it announces that courts are
disabled because of their countermajoritarian status from invalidating
facially neutral state action that causes a racially disparate impact, unless
that action reflects a discriminatory purpose. As in the case of rational basis
review, none of the reasons given by the Court to justify this judicial
restraint would disqualify Congress from enforcing a different standard, if
that standard were consistent with the requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause. Indeed, the Court seems to go out of its way to affirm legislative
competence and to invite "legislative prescription."
If Congress undertakes to remedy or deter state action that has a
discriminatory impact on a protected class, is such legislation an
appropriate means of enforcing the Equal Protection Clause, given the
manner in which the Court reasons about judicial enforcement of the Clause
in Davis and Feeney? This very problem arose in the VAWA litigation. In
striking down § 13981, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted
that the statute was in part aimed at ameliorating the discriminatory impact
of facially neutral rules that had a discriminatory impact on women, like
145. Id. at 247. For a discussion of the institutionally self-conscious justifications that the
Court offered for evaluating equal protection claims brought directly under Section 1 in a
discriminatory-purpose framework, see Siegel, supra note 143, at 1137-38 & n.130.
146. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248.
147. For a discussion of this point, see Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial
Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 857, 898-99 (1999).
148. Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
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recent statutory formulations of the marital rape exception.' 4' The court
held that because the legislative history does "not demonstrate that
Congress '[was] concem[ed],' with the type of purposeful discrimination
against women in the enforcement of facially neutral laws that could give
rise to an equal protection violation,"'1 50 the statute could not be
characterized as remedial under Boerne.
The Fourth Circuit in fact misconstrued VAWA's legislative history:
Congress heard ample testimony about openly expressed gender bias in the
administration of "facially neutral" criminal law that the Fourth Circuit
simply failed to discuss.15" ' Moreover, Kimel is clear that, even in the
absence of discriminatory purpose, Congress can enact "reasonably
prophylactic""' Section 5 legislation designed to prevent or deter
constitutional violations, and that this legislation can reach conduct that is
not itself unconstitutional.'53 But the deeper question posed by the Fourth
Circuit was whether Congress could appropriately seek under Section 5 to
remedy constitutional violations arising out of the administration of facially
neutral laws and practices, not as a means of reaching the effects of
purposeful discrimination,'54 but because Congress believed that the
discriminatory effects of such laws and practices rendered them
unconstitutional.
This question turns on whether Section 5 legislation must be congruent
and proportional to the task of remedying purposeful discrimination, or
whether it can instead be congruent and proportional to the task of
remedying facially neutral policies that have disparate effects. The
149. When the Court began to apply heightened scrutiny to laws employing gender
classifications in the mid-1970s, states modified many laws and doctrines regulating family
relations so that they were expressed in gender-neutral terms; these changes often occurred
without substantial alteration of the terms on which the relationship was otherwise regulated. For
an account of these changes, see Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2188-96 (1996). For a survey of state statutes that
illustrates how marital rape doctrine still shapes the criminal law, although often in gender-neutral
terms, see Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1373, 1375, 1484-85 (2000).
150. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 884 (4th Cir. 1999) (en
banc) (alteration in original) (citation omitted), affd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S.
Ct. 1740 (2000).
151. E.g., Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1760-61 n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting) (listing the gender bias
task force reports from twenty-one states that Congress considered); id. at 1779 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing congressional reports that documented the presence of unconstitutional gender
bias in the state court systems).
152. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631,648 (2000).
153. Thus, for example, the Court has held since the days of South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966), that Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, which is "coextensive" with
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 208 n.1
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), authorizes Congress to "outlaw voting practices that are
discriminatory in effect" even "if § I of the Amendment prohibits only purposeful
discrimination," id. at 173.
154. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 50.
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resolution of this question poses a substantive question of equal protection
law. If we read the Court in Davis and its progeny as authorizing Congress
to apply disparate impact analysis, the case is theoretically simple.
Congress is merely enforcing the Constitution as the Court has authorized it
to read the Constitution. There is no threat to ultimate judicial control over
the substantive meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The difficulty in the case arises because of uncertainty about whether
the Court has actually authorized Congress to apply this interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause. Primarily concerned with its own
implementation of the Constitution, the Court has not spoken clearly about
the bounds of Congress's independent constitutional authority. But the
Court has repeatedly emphasized that its embrace of discriminatory purpose
doctrine is rooted in concerns relating to the institutional legitimacy and
competence of Article III courts. It has asserted that making judgments
about the disparate impact of facially neutral policies is "a legislative and
not a judicial responsibility." ' It has virtually invited "legislative
prescription." 156 And it has approved Congress's wholesale extension of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to the states, replete with its
disparate impact methodology, as "an appropriate method of enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment" under Section 5.157
Application of the Boerne test is thus entangled with substantive
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. The ultimate question is
whether the Court is willing to countenance Congress's making a judgment
about the existence of a constitutional violation in terms that deviate from
those that guide the Court's own enforcement of Section 1, where the Court
has explicitly justified its own self-imposed guidelines as significantly
shaped by factors that specifically concern or constrain courts. If Congress
employs a standard for determining the existence of a constitutional
violation whose difference from the Court's can fairly be attributed to the
fact that Congress, as a legislative body, is not subject to the same resource
or legitimacy constraints as is the Court, is Congress "altering the
meaning" of the Equal Protection Clause, or is it merely "enforc[ing it], by
appropriate legislation," as it is explicitly empowered to do by Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment? Separation-of-powers values require a judicial
judgment about whether the constitutional interpretation informing
Congress's exercise of Section 5 power is appropriate to the role of
legislatively enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.
This suggests that courts cannot apply the Boerne test to
antidiscrimination laws without first interpreting the Equal Protection
155. Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
156. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
157. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 179; see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). But
see Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 306 n.12 (1977).
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Clause. 5s The question is whether and how we understand the conduct
constrained by the Equal Protection Clause to vary as the Clause is enforced
by Congress or the courts, given their distinct institutional capacities.'59 The
Court has itself suggested that there are good reasons why some equal
protection standards may be better enforced by a legislature than by the
judiciary. 60 What Congress may do in such circumstances is thus not a
question that can be decided, as the Fourth Circuit decided it, by the Boerne
test alone, without also and primarily addressing underlying substantive
issues of equal protection doctrine.
Recognizing that the Equal Protection Clause can be enforced
differently by Congress than by the Court does not contradict the primary
objective of Boerne, which is to ensure that "the ultimate interpretation and
determination of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive meaning"
remain "the province of the Judicial Branch.""'' The Court retains the
prerogative of striking down Section 5 legislation it deems constitutionally
unreasonable or as tending toward a substantive account of the Equal
Protection Clause that the Court wishes to suppress. In the last instance,
therefore, the Court always retains the authority "to say what the law is."
The essential question is how the Court should exercise this authority.
Should it defer to Congress's judgment about the proper implementation of
the Equal Protection Clause, as it defers to virtually all other exercises of
congressional power? 162 Or should it use the criteria of "congruence and
158. See Levinson, supra note 147, at 917-20.
159. As we discuss later, the Court has explicitly adopted such an institutionally
differentiated framework with respect to the enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment. See infra
text accompanying notes 257-260.
160. These suggestions have received support in the scholarly literature. E.g., Burt, supra
note 65, at 111-14; Cole, supra note 15, at 61-63; Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1966
Term--Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L.
REV. 91, 121 (1966); Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 85, at 91; McConnell, supra note 104, at 189-
92. Lawrence Sager has stressed Congress's unique ability to realize Fourteenth Amendment
norms in the face of polycentric difficulties, its ability to overcome entrenched resistance to such
norms, and its ability to energize citizens to support such norms. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes,
supra note 137, at 419-28.
161. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631,644 (2000).
162. See infra note 187. Such a deferential approach to reviewing Congress's power to enact
antidiscrimination legislation under Section 5 does not imply that the Court should adopt an
equally deferential approach when reviewing legislation in order to protect individual liberties and
fundamental rights under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment or the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 528 n.7 (1980)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Neither [Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment nor Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment] grants to Congress the authority to require the States to flout their
obligation under § I of the Fourteenth Amendment to afford 'the equal protection of the laws' or
the power to enact legislation that itself violates the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment."); id. at 548 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Congress has broad power to spend money to
provide for the 'general Welfare of the United States,' to 'regulate Commerce ... among the
several States,' to enforce the Civil War Amendments, and to discriminate between aliens and
citizens.... But the exercise of these broad powers is subject to the constraints imposed by the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. That Clause has both substantive and procedural
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proportionality" as a form of narrow tailoring closely to bind Congress's
Section 5 power to the terms of the Court's own enforcement of Section 1?
Analysis of this question requires some knowledge of the historical
relationship that the Court established with Congress in the years after
Brown, when Congress sought to use its Section 5 authority to enact
antidiscrimination legislation. It also requires an understanding of the
constitutional values at stake in properly characterizing the relationship
between Congress and the Court. Since the days of Reconstruction, the
Court has repeatedly indicated its fear that close supervision of
congressional Section 5 power may be required to preserve the values of
federalism. We thus defer analyzing the important question of how the
Court should conceptualize its relationship with Congress until Part IV,
when we will be able to draw upon our discussion of the historical
development of modem antidiscrimination legislation and upon our
consideration of Morrison's appeal to federalism, issues we now take up in
Part I1.
Il. MORRISON AND FEDERALISM
Kimel radically destabilizes congressional Section 5 power to enact
antidiscrimination legislation. But the extent of the damage is uncertain
because the Boerne test, and the separation-of-powers values it represents,
are so highly ambiguous. Read as a coarse claim of judicial supremacy,
Kimel can eviscerate Section 5 authority to combat discrimination. But
interpreted in the more flexible light we suggest, Kimel's implications are
far less grim.
Separation of powers, however, was only one of two lines of attack on
congressional Section 5 authority launched by the Court in the 1999 Term.
The second assault came in the name of federalism. It came in the Morrison
opinion, in terms more openly hostile to Congress's Section 5 powers than
Kimel. Morrison held that 42 U.S.C. § 13981, the section of VAWA that
created a civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence, 63 was
beyond congressional power under either the Commerce Clause or the
Fourteenth Amendment.
components; it performs the office of both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment in requiring that the federal sovereign act impartially.").
163. Section 13981 authorized victims to sue their attackers "for the recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a
court may deem appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994).
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A. The Logic of the Morrison Opinion
It is in fact quite difficult to ascertain the scope and grounds of
Morrison's Fourteenth Amendment holding. The Court begins its analysis
by acknowledging that Congress had exercised its power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment on the basis of a "voluminous... record"
establishing "that many participants in state justice systems are
perpetuating an array of erroneous stereotypes and assumptions" that
"often result in insufficient investigation and prosecution of gender-
motivated crime, inappropriate focus on the behavior and credibility of the
victims of that crime, and unacceptably lenient punishments for those who
are actually convicted of gender-motivated violence."' 64 The Court
concedes that such "state-sponsored gender discrimination" might very
well violate the Equal Protection Clause, but it notes that there are "certain
limitations on the manner in which Congress may attack discriminatory
conduct," limitations that "are necessary to prevent the Fourteenth
Amendment from obliterating the Framers' carefully crafted balance of
power between the States and the National Government." 165 The Court
mentions the "state action" requirement of Section 1 as " [fioremost among
these limitations." 
166
The Court then cites United States v. Harris67 and the Civil Rights
Cases,161 two 1883 decisions striking down Reconstruction-era legislation
as beyond Congress's Section 5 power, for the proposition that Section 5
legislation cannot be "'directed exclusively against the action of private
persons, without reference to the laws of the State, or their administration
by her officers."' 169 Claiming to yield to "[the] force of the doctrine of
stare decisis behind these decisions," the Court refuses to let "dicta" in
either United States v. Guest170 or District of Columbia v. Carter17 ' interfere
164. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1755 (2000).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1756.
167. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
168. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
169. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1756 (quoting Harris, 106 U.S. at 629). The Court continued:
"We reached a similar conclusion in the Civil Rights Cases. In those consolidated cases, we held
that the public accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which applied to purely
private conduct, were beyond the scope of the § 5 enforcement power." Id. The Court then
proceeded to cite to a series of modem cases holding that state action is required for a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.
170. 383 U.S. 745 (1966). In Guest, six Justices, in two independent opinions, opined that
congressional Section 5 legislation could regulate the behavior of private persons.
171. 409 U.S. 418 (1973). In Carter, the Court in a footnote that was dicta cited Guest for the
proposition that Congress could "proscribe purely private conduct under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 424 n.8.
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with its view that Congress cannot "under § 5 prohibit actions by private
individuals." 172
The Court's reasoning is very difficult to follow. It seems to conflate
the state action requirement of Section 1 with some form of limitation on
Section 5 power. There may in fact be questions after Boerne about what
kind of state action is necessary in order to establish a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause for purposes of Section 5 legislation,"7 but in Morrison
the Court explicitly acknowledges that Congress had extensively
documented unconstitutional state action in the discriminatory response of
state criminal justice systems to gender-motivated violence. 174 Morrison
therefore goes beyond a separation-of-powers analysis to intimate that even
properly "remedial" Section 5 legislation cannot "prohibit actions by
private individuals." It claims to derive this limitation on Section 5 power
from Harris and the Civil Rights Cases.
But these precedents do not support this conclusion. The Civil Rights
Cases have long been read as standing for the proposition that state action
is prerequisite for constitutional violations of the Equal Protection
Clause.' In both Harris and the Civil Rights Cases, the Court struck down
legislation that prescribed "rules for the conduct of individuals in society
toward each other" without being "corrective of any constitutional wrong
committed by the States." 76 The Civil Rights Cases, which invalidated the
Civil Rights Act of 1875, specifically held that the Act was not
"predicated" on "any supposed or apprehended violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment on the part of the States." 17  It explained:
172. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1756-58.
173. During the 1960s, the possibility that state action standards might differ for Congress
acting pursuant to Section 5 than for a court enforcing Section 1 was suggested by jurists across
the philosophical spectrum. See infra notes 264-274 and accompanying text.
174. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1755, 1758.
175. E.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972) ("In 1883, this Court in The Civil Rights Cases set forth the
essential dichotomy between discriminatory action by the State, which is prohibited by the Equal
Protection Clause, and private conduct, 'however discriminatory or wrongful,' against which that
clause 'erects no shield." (citation omitted)). Justice Rehnquist, who authored both Jackson and
Moose Lodge, was also the author of Morrison.
176. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 14 (1883). Harris, which struck down provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, turns on analogous reasoning:
When the State has been guilty of no violation of its provisions; when it has not made
or enforced any law abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; when no one of its departments has deprived any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or denied to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws; when, on the contrary, the laws of the State, as enacted by
its legislative, and construed by its judicial, and administered by its executive
departments, recognize and protect the rights of all persons, the amendment imposes no
duty and confers no power upon Congress.
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1883).
177. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 14. For a discussion of the reasoning of Harris and the
Civil Rights Cases, see Laurent B. Frantz, Congressional Power To Enforce the Fourteenth
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[U]ntil some State law has been passed, or some State action
through its officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the rights
of citizens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,
no legislation of the United States under said amendment, nor any
proceeding under such legislation, can be called into activity.
1 78
Although both Harris and the Civil Rights Cases insist that Section 5
legislation must be "corrective of [a] constitutional wrong committed by
the States," neither opinion purports to impose a restriction on Section 5
legislation that is otherwise properly remedial. They are each fully
consistent with federal regulation of private parties, so long as that
regulation is properly "corrective," which is to say "adapted to counteract
and redress the operation of... prohibited State laws or proceedings of
State officers." "9 As the Court made plain: "It is not necessary for us to
state, if we could, what legislation would be proper for Congress to adopt. It
is sufficient for us to examine whether the law in question is [corrective in]
character." '
Perhaps apprehensive about leaning so heavily on stare decisis in the
context of largely irrelevant precedents, Morrison then proceeds to argue
that "even if' its conclusion were not compelled by Harris or the Civil
Rights Cases, VAWA's civil remedy would be impermissible under
Section 5 because it fails the congruence and proportionality test of
Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964). Perhaps sensing the marginal
relevance of these precedents, the Morrison Court notes that there was
abundant evidence.., to show that the Congresses that enacted the Civil Rights Acts of
1871 and 1875 had a purpose similar to that of Congress in enacting § 13981: There
were state laws on the books bespeaking equality of treatment, but in the administration
of these laws there was discrimination against newly freed slaves.
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1758. But however accurate this may be as an account of the concerns that
led Congress to enact the Civil Rights Acts of 1871 and 1875, it is clear that the Court did not
premise its decisions about the constitutionality of the 1871 and 1875 Acts on this understanding
of the legislative history. Harris explicitly assumes as a ground of its striking down the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 that "the laws of the State, as enacted by its legislative, and construed by its
judicial, and administered by its executive departments, recognize and protect the rights of all
persons." Harris, 106 U.S. at 639. Similarly, the opinion in the Civil Rights Cases explicitly
assumes that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was not "predicated" on "any supposed or
apprehended violation of the Fourteenth Amendment on the part of the States." Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. at 14.
178. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13.
179. Id. at 18.
180. Id. at 14; see Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1779 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (providing a similar
reading of the Civil Rights Cases); Frank 1. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American
Constitutional Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 307 n.54
(1989) (" Straightforwardly read, Justice Bradley's opinion for the Court in the Civil Rights Cases
establishes not that the racially discriminatory practices of nongovernmental innkeepers and
carriers are beyond the fourteenth amendment's concern or the reach of its prohibitions, but rather
something more like the opposite.... The holding is that federal authorities... are not authorized
by the fourteenth amendment to provide remedies for privately wrought violations of rights that
the state is affirmatively obligated to vindicate, unless and until it appears that the state itself is
failing to perform this obligation." (citation omitted)).
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Boerne.1 ' Section 13981 "is directed not at any State or state actor, but at
individuals who have committed criminal acts motivated by gender
bias." 182 Furthermore, § 13981 "applies uniformly throughout the Nation,"
whereas "Congress' findings indicate that the problem of discrimination
against the victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all States,
or even most States." 
183
But this section of the Court's opinion is also unclear, for Morrison's
use of the congruence and proportionality test is conceptually quite
different from Boerne's. Boerne explicitly employed the congruence and
proportionality test to determine whether "the goal" of Section 5 legislation
was "to prevent and remedy constitutional violations" or instead to
redefine the nature of constitutional obligations.184 Kimel employed the test
for the same purpose. The Court in Morrison, however, applies the test on
the assumption that Congress's "goal" in enacting § 13981 is to counteract
bona fide violations of the Equal Protection Clause, violations inhering in
the discriminatory actions of state criminal justice systems. Morrison thus
employs the congruence and proportionality test to impose limitations on
Section 5 legislation that both Boerne and Kimel would deem properly
remedial.
Boerne and Kimel each begin with the premise "that § 5 is 'a positive
grant of legislative power' to Congress," 18' and that it is therefore "for
Congress in the first instance to 'determin[e] whether and what legislation
is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,' and its
conclusions are entitled to much deference." 18 6 Yet Morrison uses the
congruence and proportionality test to fasten tight restrictions on the
exercise of otherwise legitimate Section 5 legislation, restrictions that seem
analogous to the narrow tailoring required by strict scrutiny. We know of
no other positive constitutional grant of power to Congress that is treated
with such suspicion and hostility by the Court. The general rule is quite
otherwise. Congressional enactments within the domain of positive
constitutional grants of power are normally treated with a "deference" that
reflects a "presumption of constitutionality." 
18 7
181. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1758.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1759.
184. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997).
185. Id. at 517 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)); see also Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 644 (2000) ("[Section] 5 is an affirmative grant of power to
Congress.").
186. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 644; Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (quoting Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at
651).
187. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 120 S. Ct. 1878, 1888 (2000) (referring to "the
usual presumption of constitutionality afforded congressional enactments"); see also U.S. Dep't
of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721 (1990) ("We begin here ... by noting the heavy
presumption of constitutionality to which a 'carefully considered decision of a coequal and
representative branch of our Government' is entitled."); Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Cmty.
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Morrison is quite careless in applying its newly minted version of the
congruence and proportionality test. It notes, for example, that § 13981 "is
different from ... previously upheld remedies in that it applies uniformly
throughout the Nation":
Congress' findings indicate that the problem of discrimination
against the victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all
States, or even most States. By contrast, the § 5 remedy upheld in
Katzenbach v. Morgan... was directed only to the State where the
evil found by Congress existed, and in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach... the remedy was directed only to those States in
which Congress found that there had been discrimination.'
Morrison's reasoning here is simply wrong. The nationwide remedy of
§ 13981 is not in fact "different... from previously upheld remedies." In
Oregon v. Mitchell,' 9 the Court unanimously upheld a nationwide
prohibition on literacy tests.' 90 It did so despite the absence of "state-by-
state findings concerning... the... actual impact of literacy requirements
on the Negro citizen's access to the ballot box." 191 Justice Stewart listed the
advantages of such nationwide remedies:
Nationwide application reduces the danger that federal intervention
will be perceived as unreasonable discrimination against particular
States or particular regions of the country. This in turn increases the
likelihood of voluntary compliance with the letter and spirit of
federal law. Nationwide application facilitates the free movement
of citizens from one State to another, since it eliminates the
prospect that a change in residence will mean the loss of a federally
Action, 430 U.S. 259, 272 (1977) (noting "the presumption of constitutionality to which every
duly enacted state and federal law is entitled"). The presumption of constitutionality "is the
postulate of constitutional adjudication." New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 6 (1959). It is
"strong" because it "is not a mere polite gesture. It is a deference due to deliberate judgment by
constitutional majorities of the two Houses of Congress that an Act is within their delegated
power or is necessary and proper to execution of that power." United States v. Five Gambling
Devices, 346 U.S. 441,449 (1953).
188. Morrison, 120S. Ct. at 1759.
189. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
190. The prohibition was approved as an exercise of congressional power under Section 2 of
the Fifteenth Amendment. See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 216 (opinion of Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 235-36 (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 282-83 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But the
Court has always treated Section 2 as "coextensive" with Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. Morrison itself, in the passage quoted in
the text accompanying supra note 188, treats the Section 2 remedy of South Carolina v.
Katzenbach as interchangeable with the Section 5 remedy of Katzenbach v. Morgan.
191. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 284 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Stewart continued: "In the interests of uniformity, Congress may paint with a much broader brush
than may this Court, which must confine itself to the judicial function of deciding individual cases
and controversies upon individual records." Id.
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protected right. Nationwide application avoids the often difficult
task of drawing a line between those States where a problem is
pressing enough to warrant federal intervention and those where it
is not. Such a line may well appear discriminatory to those who
think themselves on the wrong side of it. Moreover the application
of the line to particular States can entail a substantial burden on
administrative and judicial machinery and a diversion of
enforcement resources. Finally, nationwide application may be
reasonably thought appropriate when Congress acts against an evil
such as racial discrimination which in varying degrees manifests
itself in every part of the country. A remedy for racial
discrimination which applies in all the States underlines an
awareness that the problem is a national one and reflects a national
commitment to its solution.
1 92
Moreover, Congress did not find, as Morrison suggests, that "the
problem of discrimination against the victims of gender-motivated crimes
does not exist in all States, or even most States." In fact, the record before
Congress was quite different. It included a letter signed by thirty-eight state
attorneys general urging passage of VAWA, because "the problem of
violence against women is a national one, requiring federal attention."193
Congress also "had before it the task force reports of at least 21 States
documenting constitutional violations. And it made its own findings about
pervasive gender-based stereotypes hampering many state legal systems,
sometimes unconstitutionally so."' 94 Similar evidence was sufficient to
sustain a nationwide remedy in Mitchell. Why was it insufficient in
Morrison? If the Court is for the first time going to invalidate otherwise
proper Section 5 legislation on the grounds that it does not sufficiently
correspond to the violation it is meant to remedy, certainly it is incumbent
upon the Court to explain how narrowly tailored it expects congruent and
proportional Section 5 legislation to be. Morrison does not offer a clue.
Similar conceptual difficulties plague Morrison's holding that § 13981
fails the congruence and proportionality test because "it is directed not at
any State or state actor, but at individuals who have committed criminal
acts motivated by gender bias."' 9 The holding seems deliberately to
192. Id. at 283-84.
193. Letter from Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, et al., to Jack Brooks,
Chair, House Judiciary Committee (July 22, 1993), reprinted in Crimes of Violence Motivated by
Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 34-36 (1993). The letter states that "the current system for dealing with
violence against women is inadequate." Id. at 35.
194. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1779 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 1758. The Court continued: "In the present cases, for example, § 13981 visits no
consequence whatever on any Virginia public official involved in investigating or prosecuting
Brzonkala's assault. The section is, therefore, unlike any of the § 5 remedies we have previously
upheld." Id.
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reiterate the per' se rule that Morrison earlier purported to derive from
Harris and the Civil Rights Cases. But whether a particular remedy is
congruent or proportional depends entirely on how it is tailored to the
specifics of a particular violation. It depends on whether the remedy
reasonably ameliorates the harm of the violation, given the nature of that
harm and the intrusion of the remedy. These inquiries, however, require
case-by-case examination; they do not lend themselves to per se rules. What
requires assessment is the relationship of a particular remedy to a particular
violation. A congruence and proportionality test would thus seem utterly
unsuited as a vehicle for the per se rule that Morrison might be read to
imply.
Nor is it clear that a congruence and proportionality test would be
especially hostile to Section 5 remedies directed against private parties. We
know from previous precedents, for example, that Section 5 legislation
imposing criminal penalties on private parties who conspire with state
actors to deprive persons of their Section 1 rights is constitutional. 96 If it is
congruent and proportional for Congress to sanction private parties who,
with the intent of violating the constitutional rights of a victim, break into
jail to lynch a prisoner with the implicit agreement of a sheriff, why is it not
also congruent and proportional for Congress to sanction private parties
who, with the identical intent, perform the identical acts without the
agreement of a sheriff? 97
Or, to bring the matter closer to home, why was it not congruent and
proportional for Congress in § 13981 to create private remedies for
victims of gender-motivated violence, if by hypothesis the states were
systematically and unconstitutionally failing to protect them from this
violence? The Solicitor General argued to the Court in Morrison that
"Section 13981 ... prevents and remedies the discrimination that victims
of gender-motivated crimes often face iih state justice systems by giving
them an alternative means of obtaining legal redress." ' Surely any serious
196. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966).
197. Assuming, of course, the presence of a constitutional violation. Justice Jackson, in an
opinion implicitly cited by Morrison, see infra note 201, specifically reserves this question: "We
do not say that no conspiracy by private individuals could be of such magnitude and effect as to
work a deprivation of equal protection of the laws .... Indeed, the post-Civil War Ku Klux
lan ... may have, or may reasonably be thought to have, done so." Collins v. Hardyman,
341 U.S. 651, 662 (1951). Later, in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971), the Court
became much more explicit about this question: "A century of Fourteenth Amendment
adjudication has.. . made it understandably difficult to conceive of what might constitute a
deprivation of equal protection of the laws by private persons. Yet there is nothing inherent in the
phrase that requires the action working the deprivation to come from the State."
198. Brief for the United States at 44, United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000)
(Nos. 99-5, 99-29), 1999 WL 1037259. The Solicitor General continued: "Congress could decline
to make proof of state discrimination an element of Section 13981's cause of action. Indeed, such
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application of a congruence and proportionality test would explain exactly
why this argument falls short. But Morrison offers no hint. Instead it is
content to leave its newly fashioned congruence and proportionality test
clothed with all the menace of an essentially arbitrary standard. 99
The Section 5 analysis of Morrison is exceptional in a constitutional
jurisprudence that ordinarily accords great respect to congressional
enactments, striking them down only after thoughtful consideration.
Morrison conflates the state action requirement of Section 1 with the
entirely distinct question of whether Congress may regulate private parties
under Section 5; it miscites and purports to rely upon ancient precedents; it
floats a per se rule, which it promptly withdraws by appropriating Boerne's
congruence and proportionality test to serve the new and anomalous
purpose of narrowly restricting the exercise of otherwise legitimate
congressional power; it even fails to offer a careful and clarifying
application of its own newly fashioned test.
B. Morrison and the Values of Federalism
In point of fact, the Court never pauses to explain what it finds so very
alarming in Congress's use of Section 5 power to create a civil cause of
action for victims of gender-motivated violence. The closest it comes is by
referring to the constitutional function of the state action requirement of
Section 1, which the Court notes is "necessary to prevent the Fourteenth
Amendment from obliterating the Framers' carefully crafted balance of
power between the States and the National Government." 20" This theme of
federalism is reinforced by Morrison's unusual tribute to the "force of the
doctrine of stare decisis" carried by the Court's 1883 decisions in Harris
and the Civil Rights Cases.2"' In these decisions of the first Reconstruction,
proof would have made the federal remedy much more costly and cumbersome for plaintiffs and
much more intrusive into state functions." Id. at 44 n.25.
199. As Justice Breyer notes in dissent:
But why can Congress not provide a remedy against private actors? Those private
actors, of course, did not themselves violate the Constitution. But this Court has held
that Congress at least sometimes can enact remedial "legislation ... [that] prohibits
conduct which is not itself unconstitutional." . . .The statutory remedy .... intrudes
little upon either States or private parties. It may lead state actors to improve their own
remedial systems, primarily through example. It restricts private actors only by
imposing liability for private conduct that is, in the main, already forbidden by state
law. Why is the remedy "disproportionate"? And given the relation between remedy
and violation-the creation of a federal remedy to substitute for constitutionally
inadequate state remedies-where is the lack of" congruence"?
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1779 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 1755. The Court then cites Boerne for the point that "the Amendment 'does not
concentrate power in the general government for any purpose of police government with the
States."' Id. at 1755-56.
201. In a startling passage, the Court states:
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the Court was centrally concerned with interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment to prevent Congress from adopting "general legislation upon
the rights of the citizen," limiting the scope of Section 5 instead to
"corrective legislation, that is, such as may be necessary and proper for
counteracting.., such acts and proceedings as the States may commit or
take, and which, by the [fourteenth] amendment, they are prohibited from
committing or taking." 20 2 The Civil Rights Cases held that Congress could
not "establish a code of municipal law regulative of all private rights
between man and man in society," for that "would be to make Congress
take the place of the State legislatures and to supersede them.,
20 3
Constitutional concern about preserving the "distinction between what is
truly national and what is truly local" 2 is of course also a central theme in
Morrison's account of why § 13981 cannot be justified under Congress's
Commerce Clause power.
It is federalism, then, that drives Morrison's dismissive treatment of
congressional Section 5 power. Having worked so hard in the first section
of its opinion to preserve the regulation of violence in domestic relations
from the reach of national Commerce Clause power, the Court in Morrison
was not about to turn around and let federal authority return through the
back door of Section 5. This raises the question, however, of whether
federalism constraints imposed on Section 5 should be construed in pari
materia with those imposed on the Commerce Clause. As we have
discussed,0 5 there is every reason to reject this supposition, because Section
5 has its own particular purposes and priorities that differ from the
"commercial concerns that are central to the Commerce Clause."206
The force of the doctrine of stare decisis behind these decisions stems not only from the
length of time they have been on the books, but also from the insight attributable to the
Members of the Court at that time. Every Member had been appointed by President
Lincoln, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, or Arthur-and each of their judicial appointees
obviously had intimate knowledge and familiarity with the events surrounding the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 1756. The passage evokes Justice Jackson's earlier more cautious and politically explicit
praise of Harris and the Civil Rights Cases as decisions made "by a Court, every member of
which had been appointed by President Lincoln, Grant, Hayes, Garfield or Arthur-all
indoctrinated in the cause which produced the Fourteenth Amendment, but convinced that it was
not to be used to centralize power so as to upset the federal system." Collins, 341 U.S. at 657-58.
Collins was sharply limited, if not overruled, in Griffin, 403 U.S. at 93-96.
202. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13-14 (1883).
203. Id. at 13.
204. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1754.
205. Supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
206. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). One can
therefore expect the distinct emphases and functions of Section 5 to intersect with the values of
federalism in ways that are different from those of the Commerce Clause. It is not determinative
of the federalism question for Section 5 that § 13981 touches upon what, for purposes of the
Commerce Clause, the Court may choose to regard as "areas of traditional state regulation" like
"family law" or "intrastate violence." Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1753-54. Even if the Court
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Morrison in fact does approach questions of federal power differently
in its analysis of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause than in
its analysis of Congress's authority under Section 5. Morrison's discussion
of the Commerce Clause is very careful and reasons from the premise that
federal regulation of economic matters is presumptively legitimate. In
striking contrast, Morrison's discussion of Section 5 is impatient and filled
with suspicion. Although every exercise of every federal power can be said
in some sense to subtract from the reserved "domain of State
legislation," '07 the Court clearly perceives Section 5 power as especially
troublesome in this regard, as though it carried some uniquely pernicious
capacity to unsettle the "balance of power between the States and the
National Government." 208 It is for this reason that Morrison refashions the
Boerne test into a set of strict judicial controls designed tightly to
circumscribe congressional Section 5 legislation. The Court does not dare
to impose such strict controls on federal commerce power, and indeed such
restrictions would be anomalous and unacceptable in the context of any
other positive grant of congressional power. But apparently the Court
apprehends Section 5 as singularly threatening to the independence of the
states.
To circumscribe Section 5 in the name of federalism is implicitly to
advance an image of the proper relationship between the federal
government and the states.2' The question, therefore, is what image of this
relationship might justify the restriction Morrison seeks to draw, which
seemingly would prevent Congress from employing Section 5 to regulate
the conduct of private parties. Although neither Harris nor the Civil Rights
Cases stands for the proposition that Morrison seeks to extract from them,
there is nevertheless something telling in Morrison's recourse to these
decisions of the first Reconstruction. Both cases express a vision of
federalism that is highly sympathetic to Morrison's larger project of
restricting federal power. Both present an account of our federal system in
which there are large stretches of state municipal law free from federal
interference.
This was the understanding of federalism that pervasively shaped the
Court's interpretation of the Constitution in the decades after the Civil War.
In this era, it should be recalled, the Court was determined to circumscribe
federal commerce authority by drawing lines between, for example,
"commerce" and "manufacture," on the grounds "that if the national
concludes that these areas are peripheral to the regulation of commerce, that tells us nothing about
their significance in the struggle against discrimination.
207. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
208. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1755.
209. For a good recent discussion of the values at stake in articulating such an image, see
Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REv. 317 (1997).
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power extends to all contracts and combinations in manufacture,
agriculture, mining, and other productive industries, whose ultimate result
may affect external commerce, comparatively little of business operations
and affairs would be left for state control."2 As late as 1936, the Court
was still clinging to the proposition that the regulation of "productive
industries" was beyond federal power, because "[t]he relation of employer
and employee is a local relation. At common law, it is one of the domestic
relations."2'1 But this view of the Commerce Clause was washed away in
the constitutional upheavals that brought us Wickard v. Filburn,2"2 United
States v. Darby,213 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,214 and, in more
recent times, Heart of Atlanta215 itself.
We realize, of course, that the Court is seeking in Lopez and in
Morrison to stem this tide and to rehabilitate federalism values in
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, most especially by reviving the concept of
"areas of traditional state regulation." 216 But the Court has at best offered
tiny corrections to a substantially altered landscape. No member of the
present Court, with the possible exception of Justice Thomas,217 would
consider reneging on Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach v. McClung.2"' The
fact is that today there is no discrete, categorically defined realm of social
210. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895); see also id. at 13 ("It is vital
that the independence of the commercial power and of the police power, and the delimitation
between them, however sometimes perplexing, should always be recognized and observed, for
while the one furnishes the strongest bond of union, the other is essential to the preservation of the
autonomy of the States as required by our dual form of government."); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S.
1, 20 (1888) ("No distinction is more popular to the common mind, or more clearly expressed in
economic and political literature, than that between manufactures and commerce."). But cf. Larry
D. Kramer, But When Exactly Was Judicially-Enforced Federalism "Born" in the First Place?,
22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 123, 131-35 (1998) (suggesting that the Court did not begin to
enforce federalism limits on Article I powers by invalidating politically consequential legislation
until the 1930s); id. at 135 (" [Aifter a period of gestation during the late Nineteenth and early
Twentieth Centuries, judicially-enforced federalism was 'born' only in 1935. A sickly infant from
the start, it died a quick death in 1937."); Larry D. Kramer, Putting Politics Back into the
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 215,228-33 (2000) [hereinafter Kramer,
Political Safeguards].
211. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936); see also id. at 309 ("[I]f the
commerce clause could be construed to reach transactions having an indirect effect upon interstate
commerce the federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of the people, and the
authority of the state over its domestic concems would exist only by sufferance of the federal
government." (citing Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935))).
212. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
213. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
214. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
215. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
216. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2000).
217. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 n.8 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("Although I might be willing to return to the original understanding, I recognize that many
believe that it is too late in the day to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past 60 years.
Consideration of stare decisis and reliance interests may convince us that we cannot wipe the slate
clean." (emphasis added)).
218. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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life that is immune from federal regulation.219 Even the domains Lopez and
Morrison repeatedly characterize as areas of traditional state regulation-
the family, education, and the regulation of intrastate violence-are
permeated with federal law enacted pursuant to Congress's commerce and
spending powers. What sense, then, does it make in the year 2000 for the
Court to evoke Harris and the Civil Rights Cases as limits on Section 5
power designed to protect discrete areas of social life from federal
interference?
The relationship between national and state governments in our federal
system is not static.221 One cannot simply extract an account of the national
government's powers from cases decided in 1883 and mechanically apply it
to a federal civil rights statute enacted more than one hundred years later.
As our Commerce Clause jurisprudence so richly illustrates, the practical
implications of our federalism commitments change over time, because
federalism itself is a dynamic system, expressed in institutional
relationships that evolve in history. So, for example, the economic
upheavals of the Great Depression fundamentally altered our "practical
conception" 222 of the necessity of national economic regulation "in this
interdependent world of ours." '223 Although the Court initially and
infamously resisted the implications of these altered understandings, it
eventually changed its constitutional conception of the scope and range of
Congress's power to regulate commerce. Today, the employment
relationship, which the Court once confidently declared beyond Congress's
power to regulate, now appears to us as quintessentially a sphere of
"national" regulatory concern.
The same historically and institutionally attentive approach ought to
inform any serious effort to understand the questions of federalism
219. MORTON GRODZINs, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 8 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966) ("No important activity of government in the
United States is the exclusive province of one of the levels, . .. not even the most local of local
functions, such as police and park maintenance."); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as
Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article 111, 113 HARV. L. REv. 924, 1006 (2000) (" A binary
assumption, that an issue is either 'state' or 'federal,' misses the rich complexity of governance, in
which shared and overlapping work is commonplace."); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley,
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903, 933 (1994). Even the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which was struck down in Lopez as an example of a federal
law seeking to regulate the "truly local," was easily rehabilitated by the simple and effective
expedient of inserting a jurisdictional element "that will virtually always be present." Meltzer,
supra note 43, at 1049 & n.159.
220. For an account of some of the many ways federal law regulates family life, see Jill
Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1297, 1373-85
(1998), which discusses court cases applying equal protection and privacy doctrines to the family,
as well as federal legislation in the areas of tax, immigration, child support, adoption, social
security, and welfare law, along with recent statutes such as the Defense of Marriage Act.
221. See Kramer, Political Safeguards, supra note 210, at 227.
222. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1937) (describing a change
funded by "actual experience").
223. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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presented. by Congress's Section 5 power to enact antidiscrimination
legislation. Just as our understanding of federal economic regulatory power
has changed dramatically since 1883, so has our understanding of federal
civil rights authority. The Court, however, invokes Harris and the Civil
Rights Cases as definitive accounts of how federalism ought to restrict
national efforts to protect civil rights, without pausing to inquire whether
any intervening historical developments might have qualified the
descriptive or prescriptive understandings on which these nineteenth-
century decisions are premised. The Court's assumption that national
authority to enforce civil rights has remained unaltered since the nineteenth
century is all the more remarkable given the dramatic changes in our
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause. One would think that a Court
that has enshrined Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy2 4 might at least pause
before invoking the Civil Rights Cases as an authoritative account of
federal power to regulate discrimination, given that Justice Harlan dissented
just as passionately from the Court's judgment in the Civil Rights Cases as
he did from the notorious ruling of Plessy 1
5
C. Federalism and Civil Rights
One cannot reason about the scope of the national government's
authority to enforce civil rights without addressing the history of the second
Reconstruction, which profoundly altered the federal government's role in
combating discrimination. That history is now institutionalized in judicial
precedents, congressional enactments, and executive agencies. It has been
incorporated into the common sense and experience of the country. It has
rendered the account of federalism expressed in the Civil Rights Cases as
obsolete as would be any account of federalism that relied on the authority
of Carter Coal.
224. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) ("One century ago, the first Justice
Harlan admonished this Court that the Constitution 'neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens.' Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion). Unheeded then,
those words now are understood to state a commitment to the law's neutrality where the rights of
persons are at stake."); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (" [W]e think Plessy was wrong the day it was decided, Plessy, supra, at 552-562
(Harlan, J., dissenting) .... ); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (" [O]nly a social emergency rising to the level of
imminent danger to life and limb.., can justify an exception to the principle embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment that '[olur Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens,' Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).").
225. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 54 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("It was perfectly
well known that the great danger to the equal employment by citizens of their rights, as citizens,
was to be apprehended not altogether from unfriendly State legislation, but from the hostile action
of corporations and individuals in the States. And it is to be presumed that it was intended, by
[Section 5], to clothe Congress with power and authority to meet that danger."). For a fuller
discussion of Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in the Civil Rights Cases, see infra note 237.
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We cannot in this Essay recount a full history of the fundamental
transformation that 1960s civil rights enforcement has wrought in the
texture of our federalism. But we will briefly sketch the highlights of that
story by way of suggesting just how radically implausible is Morrison's
evocation of the Civil Rights Cases to restrict Congress in the otherwise
legitimate exercise of its Section 5 powers to combat discrimination.
The epochal event was of course the enactment of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. The Act emerged from a complex history of social activism,
sparked in part by the Court's own decision in Brown,226 which, together
with the per curiams that succeeded it,227 destabilized the constitutional
legitimacy of pervasive and entrenched practices of racial segregation. By
the 1960s, protestors were aggressively confronting these practices in a
range of market settings, where segregation was backed by hybrid
configurations of public and private power. Demonstrations of civil
disobedience precipitated arrests, which protestors subsequently challenged
on federal constitutional grounds. 2 8 The executive and judicial branches of
226. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
227. E.g., Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (per curiam) (city auditorium), affig 219 F.
Supp. 204 (E.D. La. 1963); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam) (public
facilities); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam) (restaurant); State
Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (per curiam) (sporting events), aff g 168 F.
Supp. 149 (E.D. La. 1958); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54
(1958) (per curiam) (public parks), affg 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.); Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dirs.,
353 U.S. 230 (1957) (per curian) (school); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam)
(buses), affg 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.); Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 350 U.S.
413 (1956) (per curiam) (graduate professional program); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879
(per curiam) (public golf course), rev'g 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955); Mayor of Baltimore City v.
Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (public beaches), affg 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.); Muir v.
Louisville Park Theatrical Assoc., 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (per curiam) (privately run opera
performance), rev'g 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953).
228. Numerous cases ended up before the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Harem v. City of Rock
Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964) (5-4 decision) (reversing convictions arising out of sit-ins because the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 while the appeal was pending abated the prosecutions);
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) (invalidating on vagueness grounds the
convictions of sit-in demonstrators for refusing to leave premises after being asked to do so); Bell
v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (vacating and remanding sit-in convictions to be reconsidered
in the light of the intervening enactment of state and local public accommodations laws);
Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964) (reversing sit-in convictions on the grounds that a state
regulation mandating racially separate washroom facilities for restaurant employees and
customers constituted state action); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964) (per curiarn)
(reversing convictions arising out of a sit-in for lack of evidence); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
130 (1964) (reversing trespass convictions on the grounds that the arrest by a park employee who
had been deputized as sheriff constituted state action); Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776
(1964) (per curiam) (reversing the convictions arising out of a peaceful assembly on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds); Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963) (certifying to the
Florida Supreme Court a number of state-law questions arising out of convictions in a "Freedom
Ride" case); Fields v. South Carolina, 375 U.S. 44 (1963) (summarily reversing breach-of-peace
convictions); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963) (reversing breach-of-peace convictions of
blacks for playing basketball in a public park on grounds of inadequate warning under the Due
Process Clause); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (per curiam) (reversing
convictions arising out of a sit-in because a local ordinance required segregation in restaurants);
Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam) (reversing a contempt conviction for
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the federal government were thus forced to decide whether to support
protesters confronting racial segregation at lunch counters and other
"private" establishments, or instead to back state authorities deploying
state criminal law in support of the right of private property owners to
discriminate in their choice of customers.229 Only after the federal courts
were clogged with thousands of such cases did the Kennedy Justice
Department and a bipartisan congressional coalition decide to draft federal
legislation outlawing racial discrimination by business establishments and
employers.23
The question was whether Congress had the constitutional power to
enact such a law. The New Deal revolution in congressional commerce
power was barely twenty-five years old. It had established that the federal
government could enforce wage and hours regulation in employment
relationships. But at the beginning of the 1960s, it was by no means clear
that the national government had the authority to enforce norms of racial
equality in those same relationships.3 That issue did not even emerge until
refusing to leave a white-only area of the courtroom on equal protection grounds); Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (reversing convictions arising out of a public protest on First
Amendment grounds); Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962) (per curiam) (reversing
convictions arising out of a sit-in at a bus terminal for lack of evidence); Garner v. Louisiana,
368 U.S. 157 (1961) (reversing disturbing-the-peace convictions of sit-in demonstrators on the
due process ground of total absence of evidence).
229. See generally JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED
BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIvIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 306-17 (1994) (describing sit-
in cases litigated by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in the Supreme Court); MORTON J.
HORwITz, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 38-48 (1998) (describing the civil
disobedience decisions of the Supreme Court between 1964 and 1967); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLmCs 227-29 (2000) (describing sit-in cases of 1963 and
1964).
230. Jack Greenberg reports that in 1964 there were several thousand sit-in cases in the
federal courts. GREENBERG, supra note 229, at 316-17 (discussing the argument of Hamm,
379 U.S. 306). For one account of the ways that civil disobedience protests shaped the civil rights
agenda of the Kennedy Administration, see HARRIS WOFFORD, OF KENNEDYS AND KINGS:
MAKING SENSE OF THE SIXTIES 103-77 (1980). See also PHILIP A. KLINKNER WITH ROGERS M.
SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA
264-75 (1999) (describing how the initiative to enact a civil rights bill arose out of symbolic
politics of the Cold War and escalating pressures created by civil disobedience protests,
culminating in the bombing of a black church in Birmingham); Norbert A. Schlei, Foreword to
BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, at vii,
viii-ix (1976) (describing how the Birmingham demonstrations and sit-ins in May and June of
1963 prodded the Kennedy Administration into proposing a civil rights bill). Norbert Schlei was
an Assistant Attorney General and was in charge of drafting the Administration's bill.
231. Prior to 1960, there were, of course, civil rights and race equality claims sporadically
asserted in the labor context. Historians are still uncovering the roots of modem civil rights
tradition in the New Deal era. See, e.g., William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship,
98 MICH. L. REv. 1, 80 (1999) (presenting a vision of a "labor-based civil rights movement" that
never realized its potential during or after the New Deal). For a new and provocative account of
the federal government's early efforts to protect civil rights in market relationships in the wake of
the New Deal, see Risa L. Goluboff, A Road Not Taken: The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost
Origins of Civil Rights, 50 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming Apr. 2001), which discusses the legal practice
and constitutional interpretations of the Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice between
1939 and 1954.
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the civil rights struggles that succeeded Brown. Modem constitutional law
casebooks notwithstanding, Congress's power to enact the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 did not follow simply from its authority to regulate the production
of homegrown wheat.232 It deeply misconceives the constitutional issues
posed by the Act to imagine that it was merely a logical entailment of the
1937 revolution. The Act in fact posed questions about the reach of
federal power that were politically and conceptually distinct from the
understandings of the New Deal.
Underlying the debates provoked by the sit-ins and protests was the
assumption, elaborated and formalized with the spread of Jim Crow, that
owners of private property had a "right" or "liberty" to discriminate in the
customers they would serve. Although Anglo-American common law had
imposed on at least some business owners the duty to serve customers on a
nondiscriminatory basis,233 the linkage of property ownership with the
liberty to discriminate found increasingly forceful expression in the decades
after the Civil War as white Americans invoked racial notions of
associational privacy to justify practices of racial segregation in both public
and private spheres.2"
Both the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy explicitly drew on this
racialized conception of the freedom to associate. These nineteenth-century
decisions were premised upon the view that the Constitution conferred upon
the emancipated slaves equality in civil, but not social, rights. From this
standpoint, law neither could nor should enforce "social equality" among
the races. 5 The commitment to provide emancipated slaves equality at law
232. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
233. The classic statement of this doctrine is Lord Chief Justice Holt's dissent in Lane v.
Cotton:
If on the road a shoe fall off my horse, and I come to a smith to have one put on, and
the smith refuse to do it, an action will lie against him .... If an innkeeper refuse to
entertain a guest where his house is not full, an action will lie against him, and so
against a carrier, if his horses be not loaded, and he refuse to take a packet proper to be
sent by a carrier ....
88 Eng. Rep. 1458, 1464-65 (K.B. 1701) (Holt, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
234. Siegel, supra note 143, at 1121-28 (illustrating how, over time, the concept of
associational privacy was employed to justify state-enforced segregation of marriage, education,
transportation, and accommodations); Joseph William Singer, No Right To Exclude: Public
Accommodations and Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996) (tracing the expansion of
the common-law duty to serve in the period before the Civil War and demonstrating how
American common-law courts came to celebrate the right of private property owners to
discriminate in the use of their property in the decades after the Civil War).
235. For sources discussing the ways that white Americans invoked distinctions among civil,
political, and social rights in reasoning about the rights of African Americans during the
nineteenth century, see Siegel, supra note 143, at 1120 n.28. See also id. at 1123-28 (tracing
discourse in debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1875, cases applying the Civil Rights Act of
1875, the Supreme Court decision invalidating the Civil Rights Act of 1875, and the decision in
Plessy v. Ferguson upholding a statute mandating segregation of public accommodations under
the Fourteenth Amendment). For an account that analyzes the efforts of African Americans to
make emancipatory demands within this discursive framework, see CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT
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was thus bounded by a competing commitment to protect the freedom of
"all" Americans to discriminate in the choice of their associates. "It would
be running the slavery argument into the ground," the Court reasoned in the
Civil Rights Cases,
to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may
see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people
he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or
theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or business.236
In essence, the Court used the distinction between civil and social rights
to mark a sphere of associational freedom in which law would allow
practices of race discrimination to flourish. The logic of federalism that the
Court employed in decisions like the Civil Rights Cases was thoroughly
imbued with this concern about protecting the freedom to discriminate in
racial associations. 37 The need to protect this sphere of associational
& JOHN Louis LUCAITES,.CRAFTING EQUALITY: AMERICA'S ANGLO-AFRICAN WORD 94-110
(1993).
236. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883).
237. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court held that Congress lacked power under the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited
discrimination in public accommodations. The role played by race in the Court's judgment about
the limits of federal power is most apparent in the Court's interpretation of the Thirteenth
Amendment. The Court held that although the Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress direct and
plenary authority to enforce the prohibition on slavery, id. at 18, 23, the federal government could
enact only legislation that protected the civil rights of the freedmen, not their "social rights," id.
at 22. In the Court's view, the 1875 Act's prohibition of race discrimination in transportation and
accommodations had "nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude." Id. at 24; see also id.
at 25 ("There were thousands of free colored people in this country before the abolition of
slavery, enjoying all the essential rights of life, liberty and property the same as white citizens; yet
no one, at that time, thought that it was any invasion of his personal status as a freeman because
he was not admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by white citizens, or because he was subjected to
discriminations in the enjoyment of accommodations in inns, public conveyances and places of
amusement. Mere discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as badges of
slavery."). Thus, although the Court conceded that Congress's power under Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment was direct and plenary, it used the distinction between civil and social
rights to confine federal power under the Thirteenth Amendment in the interests of preserving a
sphere of " private" association in which racial discrimination could be freely practiced.
The same dynamic is perceptible in the Court's treatment of the claim that the 1875 Act
could be sustained as an exercise of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Having held in the Slaughter-House Cases that the primary purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to redress "the grievances" of "the slave race," 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36, 71-72 (1872), the Court in the Civil Rights Cases proceeded to hold that Congress lacked
direct and plenary power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and could only exercise Section 5
power when it was seeking to remedy state action that violated the Amendment. Thus, although
Section 5 would appear on its face to cede to Congress expansive power to redress racial
discrimination, the Court in the Civil Rights Cases restrictively interpreted that power by
emphasizing the state action language in Section 1. It is not clear from the Court's opinion in the
Civil Rights Cases what forms of race-based state action would violate Section 1, cf Pace v.
Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882) (upholding, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state law
punishing interracial cohabitation, fornication, adultery, or marriage), or how the distinction
between civil and social rights would bear on this question, cf. Siegel, supra note 143, at 1123-27
(demonstrating that "distinctions between civil and social rights were not fixed, but instead were
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freedom also drove the Court's conclusion thirteen years later in Plessy that
state-mandated segregation of public accommodations did not violate
Section 1 of either the Thirteenth or the Fourteenth Amendment. 38
Civil disobedience following in the wake of Brown dramatically
contested this racialized conception of associational liberty. As protesters
forged in the struggle over the scope of Reconstruction legislation"). Thirteen years later, of
course, the Court in Plessy would use the distinction between civil and social rights sharply to
limit the reach of Section 1. See infra note 238.
To appreciate fully the role that racial assumptions play in shaping the Court's reasoning in
the Civil Rights Cases, it is helpful to compare Justice Bradley's reasoning with Justice Harlan's
dissenting opinion in the case. While Bradley assumes that racial discrimination will remain a
normal and largely unobjectionable feature of social life in the United States, Harlan reasons that
because the institution of slavery "rested wholly upon the inferiority, as a race, of those held in
bondage, their freedom necessarily involved immunity from, and protection against, all
discrimination against them, because of their race, in respect of such civil rights as belong to
freemen of other races." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Arguing that
access to public accommodations is a civil right protected by the common law, Harlan concludes
that Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment to enact the provisions of the 1875
Act that prohibit race discrimination in public accommodations. Harlan also defends the 1875 Act
as a proper exercise of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. In Justice
Harlan's view, Section 5 vests Congress with direct and primary authority to enforce the
provisions of Section 1, including its first sentence, which reverses the Dred Scott decision, Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), and makes all persons born or naturalized in the
United States citizens of the United States. Cf Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 46 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (reading the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as "introduc[ing] all of that
race, whose ancestors had been imported and sold as slaves, at once, into the political community
known as the 'People of the United States"'). Citizenship carries the right to be free from racial
discrimination in respect to civil rights. "[Ulnless the recent amendments be splendid baubles,
thrown out to delude those who deserved fair and generous treatment at the hands of the
nation[, c]itizenship in this country necessarily imports at least equality of ciyil rights among
citizens of every race in the same State." Id. at 48. It follows for Harlan that Congress can enact
legislation enforcing racial equality in civil rights by exercise of its power under Section 5. It is
evident, then, that the competing views of federalism advanced by Justice Bradley and Justice
Harlan in the Civil Rights Cases express contrasting normative assumptions about the
permissibility of race discrimination in the aftermath of slavery. Cf. PAMELA BRANDWEIN,
RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRODUCTION OF
HISTORICAL TRUTH 23-60 (1999) (arguing that the racial content of Reconstruction debates about
federalism can be discerned by considering the racial understandings informing the proponents'
differing approaches to slavery and its abolition).
238. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plessy repeatedly invokes the distinction
between civil and social rights in the course of explaining why laws mandating segregation are
permissible under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id at 544 ("The
object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before
the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based
upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the
two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either."); id. at 551-52 ("If the two races are to meet upon
terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each
other's merits and a voluntary consent of individuals.... If the civil and political rights of both
races be equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the
other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane."). In
holding that such segregation is constitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment, Plessy
essentially recapitulates the argument of the Civil Rights Cases. Id. at 543 (" 'It would be running
the slavery argument into the ground,' said Mr. Justice Bradley, 'to make it apply to every act of
discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the
people he will ... deal with in other matters of intercourse or business."' (quoting Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. at 24-25)).
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staged sit-ins designed to challenge the freedom of white Americans to
segregate black Americans in commonplace social transactions, business
owners in turn invoked the power of the state to enforce their right to
segregate commercial establishments. The ensuing conflicts posed deep
questions about whether national power should intervene to uproot this
racialized conception of property and liberty, or whether it should instead
turn a blind eye, as it had since the end of Reconstruction. While many
states had adopted some form of legislation prohibiting discrimination in
public accommodations by the early 1960s,239 Southern states in particular
were determined to resist a federal law that would interfere with customs of
segregation in market transactions. The South's filibuster of the civil rights
bill in the Senate "was the longest on record, eighty-two days," taking up
"63,000 pages of the Congressional Record."240
This protracted struggle fundamentally altered the ways in which
Americans reasoned about national power, changing understandings of both
federalism and liberty. Before 1964, it was still commonplace for public
figures like Robert Bork and Milton Friedman to decry the prospect of
federal interference with the freedom of business owners to discriminate in
their choice of customers or employees, 4' and to equate it with
McCarthyism, 42  communism,243  fascism, 44  socialism, 245  involuntary
239. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 284-85 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring in part)
(listing, in an appendix prepared by the United States Commission on Civil Rights, state
antidiscrimination laws as of 1964).
240. POWE, supra note 229, at 233; see also id. at 232 (reporting that "the Civil Rights Act
passed the House of Representatives by the overwhelming bipartisan margin of 290-130, 104 of
the dissenters being southern Democrats, who fully understood that this bill was aimed directly at
the white South").
241. These objections were the mainstay of opposition to the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 in Congress. E.g., 2 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1304 (Bernard
Schwartz ed., 1970) (excerpting the congressional floor debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1964)
(statement of Sen. Tower) (" [W]hat is left of individual liberty if a man or a woman cannot
choose associates in work or in play on the basis of either reason or prejudice, which are often
indistinguishable?"); id. at 1121 (statement of Rep. Willis) ("In the teeth of previous rulings of
the courts to the contrary, title II undertakes to order that from here on the 14th amendment shall
mean that the private owner of a place of business, such as a restaurant and many others, cannot
choose his customers."); id. at 1129 (statement of Rep. Abernethy) ("An owner of property
should not be compelled to serve or entertain or otherwise accommodate anybody that he, the
owner, does not want to accommodate.").
242. E.g., Robert Bork, Civil Rights-A Challenge, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, at 21, 24
(arguing that just as with " McCarthyism," "the issue was not whether communism was good or
evil but whether men ought to be free to think and talk as they pleased," so too "[i]t is not
whether racial prejudice or preference is a good thing but whether individual men ought to be free
to deal and associate with whom they please for whatever reasons appeal to them"); see also id. at
22 ("There seems to be a strong disposition on the part of proponents of the legislation simply to
ignore the fact that it means a loss in a vital area of personal liberty.. .. The principle of such
legislation is that if I find your behavior ugly by my standards, moral or aesthetic, and if you
prove stubborn about adopting my view of the situation, I am justified in having the state coerce
you into more righteous paths. That is itself a principle of unsurpassed ugliness.").
243. E.g., 110 CONG. REC. 9184 (1964) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) (stating that "FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover has confirmed ... that 'Communist influence does exist in the Negro
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servitude , ' or worse.247 It is a measure of the fundamental changes
wrought by the second Reconstruction that these public and prominent
objections to federal enforcement of antidiscrimination norms now sound
like voices from another world.248
movement,"' and demanding that Congress inquire into "these subversive influences which have
promoted racial strife and turmoil and which have been responsible in a large measure for
promoting and inspiring the pending so-called civil rights legislation"); 2 STATUTORY HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 241, at 1421 (statement of Rep. Smith) ("Already the second
invasion of carpetbaggers of the Southland has begun. Hordes of beatniks, misfits, and agitators
from the North, with the admitted aid of the Communists, are streaming into the Southland on
mischief bent, backed and defended by other hordes of Federal marshals, Federal agents, and
Federal power.").
244. E.g., 110 CONG. REC. 9030 (1964) (colloquy between Sens. Talmadge and Tower) (Sen.
Talmadge observing that "so long as we have discrimination, we shall have freedom. When we
cease to have discrimination, we shall have an ant-hill society, in which the Government will call
the shots," and Sen. Tower responding, "I think we will have about arrived at '1984' when that
occurs"); 2 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 241, at 1293 (statement of
Sen. Ervin) ("I will agree that if this bill were passed, that the America I have known and loved,
the America that believes in liberty rather than Government by regimentation, would be
supplanted by a police state."); id. at 1401 (statement of Sen. Goldwater) ("To give genuine
effect to the prohibitions of this bill will require the creation of a Federal police force of mammoth
proportions. It also bids fair to result in the development of an 'informer' psychology in great
areas of our national life-neighbors spying on neighbors, workers spying on workers, business
spying on businessmen .... These, the Federal police force and an 'informer' psychology, are the
hallmarks of the police state and landmarks of the destruction of a free society.").
245. E.g., 2 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 241, at 1299
(statement of Sen. Tower) ("If Federal Government is to inject itself to this extent into the
operation of the nation's industry, it may well find itself in complete charge under a Socialist
state.").
246. See Alfred Avins, Freedom of Choice in Personal Service Occupations: Thirteenth
Amendment Limitations on Antidiscrimination Legislation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 228 (1964) (arguing
that state legislation requiring nondiscrimination in public accommodations and various personal
service occupations violates the Thirteenth Amendment by forcing one person to serve another),
cited in 110 CONG. REc. 8633 (1964). Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was in fact
challenged as an "involuntary servitude" in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, a challenge
summarily dismissed by the Court. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261
(1964). But see. Browning v. Slenderella Sys., 341 P.2d 859, 869 (Wash. 1959) (Mallery, J.,
dissenting) ("The right to exclusiveness, like the right to privacy, is essential to
freedom.... When a white woman is compelled against her will to give a Negress a Swedish
massage, that ... is involuntary servitude.").
247. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 113 (1982 ed.) (originally published in
1962) ("The Hitler Nuremberg laws... [are] similar in principle to [Title VII]."); 2 STATUTORY
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 241, at 1165-66 (colloquy between Sens. Sparkman
and Talmadge) (arguing that the Civil Rights Act would empower another Mussolini or Hitler); id.
at 1302 (colloquy between Sens. Hill and Tower) (same).
248. E.g., 2 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 241, at 1132
(statement of Rep. Abemethy) ("If a department store manager wants to hire blond sales clerks,
he can hire all blond sales clerks. His wife might object but the Federal Government cannot. Title
VII would change all this .... The most remote corner of our social structure and virtually all of
our economic structure would be reached, cajoled, and controlled by this incredible proposal.");
id. at 1274-75 (statement of Sen. Long) (" [Iit is desirable for the colored, as well as the white, to
associate with their own kind, and to have their social relationships among their own kind. [I]
believe[] that is the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the white, as well as the colored-
reserving the right of anyone who wants to mix to do so."); id. at 1304 (statement of Sen. Tower)
("Where was the Congress ever given the power to declare it to be a wrong for an American to
dislike to associate with persons of nations or races which have recently made war on America
and treacherously killed or cruelly tortured the sons, brothers, or fathers of living Americans?").
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This transformation in American expectations about the purposes and
reach of federal regulatory power did not grow out of the constitutional
upheavals of the New Deal. Nor was it asserted, or legitimated, as a simple
corollary of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. It emerged
instead from a set of historically distinct struggles and debates about the
enforcement of antidiscrimination norms in discrete areas of social life. The
burning normative question was whether Congress could or should
intervene to reform this deeply engrained, racialized understanding of
property and liberty. The substance of the controversy inhered in disputes
about the norms and commitments that inhabit the Equal Protection Clause.
On the level of formal constitutional discourse, however, the
constitutional debates surrounding the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 revolved around the question of whether the statute should be enacted
as an exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce or
instead of its Section 5 power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 9
Eventually Congress split the difference and drafted the statute to rely upon
both the Commerce Clause and upon Section 5.250 When the Court
considered the validity of the Act in Heart of Atlanta, it chose to affirm its
constitutionality as an exercise of the commerce power, reserving judgment
on the question of whether it might also be a legitimate exercise of
Congress's authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment?5 But although
the Court was cautious about attributing Congress's power to prohibit
discrimination by private actors to Congress's power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, and would remain so throughout the decade, it was
not in the least ambivalent about the larger point, which was that Congress
Today such objections to federal enforcement of antidiscrimination norms in market
transactions are rarely voiced by officials in public settings. But discourses of the racial private
sphere once used to oppose laws enforcing antidiscrimination norms in business transactions have
now taken on new life in debates over affirmative action. See Reva B. Siegel, The Racial
Rhetorics of Colorblind Constitutionalism: The Case of Hopwood v. Texas, in RACE AND
REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE AcTION 29, 52-61 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1998)
(tracing the evolution of racial privacy discourse in the period after the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 from the claim that civil rights law should respect associational freedom to a
claim that civil rights law should respect the market allocations individuals and groups secure
through meritocratic competition, and illustrating how courts and commentators invoked this new
discourse of the racial private sphere as a basis for restricting affirmative action).
249. There were, in fact, congressional proponents of each view, and extended debates about
the kinds of transactions Congress might reach by exercise of each source of power. For a good
summary of the debates, see MORGAN, supra note 22, at 292-330; see also Heart of Atlanta,
379 U.S. at 286-91 (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing, in an appendix, the Fourteenth
Amendment basis of the enacted public accommodations title).
250. The Act applies to a public accommodation "if its operations affect commerce, or if
discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1994); see
also supra note 22.
251. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 250 ("[We have therefore not considered the other
grounds relied upon. This is not to say that the remaining authority upon which [Congress] acted
was not adequate, a question upon which we do not pass, but merely that since the commerce
power is sufficient for our decision here we have considered it alone."); see also supra note 23.
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had authority to enact legislation applying antidiscrimination norms to
transactions between private parties.
This can be seen clearly in the Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence
that the Court developed at that time. The Civil Rights Cases had held that
Congress could not enact the 1875 Civil Rights Act under the Thirteenth
Amendment because racial discrimination in "matters of intercourse or
business" 52 was not a badge or incident of slavery that Congress could
regulate under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.253 But in the 1960s
the Court effectively overruled this aspect of the Civil Rights Cases and
held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co."4 that Congress could prohibit
discrimination by private individuals in a variety of social transactions
under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.255 "Surely Congress has the
power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are
the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that
determination into effective legislation." 25 6
The Court was so determined to ensure that Congress had sufficient
authority to regulate discriminatory conduct by private parties that it
expanded Congress's power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment without
according a similarly capacious interpretation to the self-enforcing
provisions of Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment. 7 The issue came to
252. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
253. Underlying the holding was a concept of federalism designed to uphold the freedom to
discriminate in "social" matters. For a full discussion of this point, see supra note 237. The Court
continued for many decades to invoke this same understanding of federalism to read the
Thirteenth Amendment very narrowly. E.g., Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 18 (1906); cf
Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330-31 (1926).
254. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
255. Id. at 440-41. In Jones, the Court construed section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994), to reach discrimination in real property transactions by
private actors, holding also that Congress had the power under Section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment to enact § 1982. The Court observed:
[T]he fact that § 1982 operates upon the unofficial acts of private individuals, whether
or not sanctioned by state law, presents no constitutional problem. If Congress has
power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eradicate conditions that prevent Negroes
from buying and renting property because of their race or color, then no federal statute
calculated to achieve that objective can be thought to exceed the constitutional power
of Congress simply because it reaches beyond state action to regulate the conduct of
private individuals.
Jones, 392 U.S. at 438-39. For a discussion, see Note, Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth Amendment
and the Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1019 (1969). The Court later
construed another Reconstruction statute derived from section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994), to prohibit private schools from discriminating on the basis of race.
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). In the ensuing years, federal courts developed a body
of doctrine that integrated eases decided under these revived nineteenth-century statutes with
cases arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Note, Federal
Power To Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the
Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 449, 466-505 (1974).
256. Jones, 392 U.S. at 440.
257. The Thirteenth Amendment provides:
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a head in Palmer v. Thompson,258 when the Court rejected constitutional
challenges to a decision by Jackson, Mississippi, to close a municipal
swimming pool rather than to desegregate it. In response to the argument
that the city's decision constituted a "badge or incident" of slavery
condemned by the Thirteenth Amendment, Palmer stated:
The denial of the right of Negroes to swim in pools with white
people is said to be a "badge or incident" of slavery. Consequently,
the argument seems to run, this Court should declare that the city's
closing of the pools to keep the two races from swimming together
violates the Thirteenth Amendment.... Establishing this Court's
authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to declare new laws to
govern the thousands of towns and cities of the country would grant
it a law-making power far beyond the imagination of the
amendment's authors. Finally, although the Thirteenth Amendment
is a skimpy collection of words to allow this Court to legislate new
laws to control the operation of swimming pools throughout the
length and breadth of this Nation, the Amendment does contain
other words that we held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. could
empower Congress to outlaw "badges of slavery." The last
sentence of the Amendment reads: "Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation." But Congress has
passed no law under this power to regulate a city's opening or
closing of swimming pools or other recreational facilities.
2 59
The Court was thus willing to read Section 2 as authorizing Congress to
regulate discriminatory conduct that the Court was itself unprepared to
declare violated Section 1 in litigation seeking judicial enforcement of the
Thirteenth Amendment."' Because issues of equal protection in the 1960s
revolved almost entirely around questions of racial discrimination, this
broad interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment's enforcement clause,
when coupled with Congress's Commerce Clause power, essentially ceded
to Congress sufficient constitutional authority to regulate the full range of
discriminatory conduct by private actors it sought to reach.
By the end of the 1960s, in short, the landscape of federalism had been
fundamentally altered. Social activism had forced the question of
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XmfI.
258. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
259. Id. at 226-27 (emphasis added).
260. See Laycock, supra note 84, at 755; Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes, supra note 137, at
433; cf. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 125 (1981).
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discrimination by private actors to the top of the national agenda, and
Congress had responded with major legislation to address the problem. This
legislation was ratified by the Court, whether based upon the Commerce
Clause, the Thirteenth Amendment, or the spending power. One way or the
other, what would have been unimaginable in prior decades had come to
pass: The struggle against discrimination by private actors had become a
legitimate end of the federal government.
It is true that throughout this period the Court never squarely addressed
the scope of Congress's power to prohibit discrimination by private actors
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Guest, concurring
opinions joined by six Justices suggested that under Section 5, Congress
could enact laws punishing conspiracies by private actors to interfere with
Fourteenth Amendment rights.26 But the Court's opinion in Guest, as
elsewhere, explicitly reserved the question.262
Why did the Court avoid the question of Section 5 power in cases such
as Heart of Atlanta and Guest? The question cannot be definitively
answered, but several considerations seem to have played an important part.
It certainly weighed heavily with the Court that the interpretation of
Section 5 was tied in significant and contested ways to the construction of
Section 1. In 1963, most observers interpreted the Civil Rights Cases as
requiring that Section 5 legislation remedy discrimination involving state
action of the kind required for equal protection claims arising under the
judicially enforceable provisions of Section 1; the debates over the 1964
Act were conducted on this assumption.263 Judicial pronouncements
concerning the scope of Congress's powers under Section 5 thus might
affect the kinds of state action claims plaintiffs could ask courts to
adjudicate under Section 1. Throughout the 1960s the Court was under
intense pressure to relax the state action requirement for judicial
261. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 782 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("A majority of the members of the Court expresses the view today that § 5
empowers Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of
Fourteenth Amendment rights, whether or not state officers or others acting under the color of
state law are implicated in the conspiracy."); see also District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S.
418,424 n.8 (1973) (dictum).
262. Guest, 383 U.S. at 755; see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 107 (1971)
(" [Tihe allegations of the complaint in this case have not required consideration of the scope of
the power of Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
263. See, e.g., sources cited in note 266 infra. Even in Heart of Atlanta, the concurring
opinions of Justices Douglas and Goldberg, which argued that the 1964 Act ought to be upheld as
an exercise of Section 5 power, both assumed that a judicially enforceable violation of Section 1
was a necessary predicate to the exercise of Section 5 power. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 280 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 376-77 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring). Both Justices Douglas and Goldberg were willing to extend the state action
requirement of Section 1 to reach "discriminatory treatment (based on race) in places of public
accommodation" by private parties. Id. at 280 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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enforcement of Section ." Particularly after Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority,26 s the nature of this requirement was uncertain,266
reflecting an instability that was intensified by the constant and unremitting
strain of the sit-in cases.267
It was not until the Court's protracted deliberations in Bell v.
Maryland268---conducted while debate raged in the Senate over the 1964
264. See Michael Kiarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 213, 276 (1991) ("[A] brief survey of the period's constitutional commentary... reveals
that the dominant trend in legal academic thought espoused abolition of the state action
requirement."). The pressure to liberalize the state action requirement in equal protection cases is
a central theme of the Harvard Law Review's Supreme Court Forewords authored by Archibald
Cox in 1966 and Charles Black in 1967. See Cox, supra note 160; Charles L. Black, Jr., The
Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69 (1967); see also John Silard, A Constitutional Forecast:
Demise of the "State Action " Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 855
(1966).
265. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
266. At this time Supreme Court case law could be read as supporting a claim of state action
in many racially discriminatory situations not involving formal action or authorization by the
state. See MORGAN, supra note 22, at 297 (noting that in the early 1960s, "one might plausibly
construe the amendment as encompassing state enforcement of discrimination based solely on
custom or usage and lacking any prior state authorization"). The uncertainty surrounding the state
action requirement was so great that Republican congressmen advocating a Fourteenth
Amendment basis for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 repeatedly pointed to state action precedents
suggesting that discrimination in public accommodations licensed by the state was actionable
under the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Civil Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 1388 (1963) (questioning of Rep. McCulloch); id. at
1395 (statement of Rep. Lindsay) (" The 14th amendment approach in effect would cover a public
facility which is privately owned and which is authorized to do business by the State."); id. at
160t (statement of Rep. Lindsay) (stating, in response to the question "[D]o you take the position
then that if there is a license or permit issued by the State or a subdivision of the State that any
action that might be taken will come under the prohibition of the 14th amendment?" that
"I would like to argue that case in the Supreme Court, and I think 1 would win it today").
267. Observers of the Court well appreciated that the sit-in cases put increasing pressure on
state action limitations restricting judicial enforcement of Section 1. E.g., Thomas P. Lewis, The
Sit-In Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 101, 101 ("In the Sit-in Cases decided last
Term the Supreme Court inched closer to a confrontation with perhaps the most interesting, most
discussed-perhaps the most crucial-issue since the decision of the School Segregation Cases.
In some respects the resolution of this issue, whether the Fourteenth Amendment provides the
Negro with a self-executing federal right to equal treatment by the proprietors of private
establishments catering to all the public except Negroes, may have more far-reaching implications
and greater consequences than even the School Segregation Cases." (footnotes omitted)).
The Court's deliberations in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), which occurred during
congressional debates over the 1964 Act, show four-and possibly five-Justices ready to reverse
the restaurant sit-in convictions on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Compare POWE, supra note
229, at 227-29 (reporting that Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Goldberg
were ready to reverse the convictions on Fourteenth Amendment grounds), with Klarman, supra
note 264, at 273-77 (reporting that after a long delay in the Court's internal deliberations in the
case, Justice Clark circulated a draft opinion that would have found state action, but subsequent
state law developments enabled Justice Brennan to build a majority for reversing the convictions
on retroactive abatement grounds). Apparently concerned that an adverse decision in the case
might be viewed by some to undercut chances for the Act's passage, the Court delayed deciding
the case, and then finally reversed the sit-in convictions on state-law grounds just three days after
the Senate passed the Act, and ten days before it became law. HORWrTZ, supra note 229, at 39-41;
POWE, supra note 229, at 229.
268. 378 U.S. 226.
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Civil Rights Act-that Justice Black seems first to have suggested the
possibility that Congress could use as a predicate for Section 5 legislation
discrimination that did not necessarily meet the state action requirement of
Section 1.269 Two years later in Guest, the Court itself explicitly reserved
the question of whether Section 5 legislation needed to be predicated on the
same state action requirement as Section 1,70 and in that same year in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court held in the alternative that Section 5
269. In his dissent in Bell, Justice Black intimated that although the majority could and
should have sustained the sit-in convictions, Congress might have power under the Fourteenth
Amendment to enact legislation prohibiting discriminatory conduct that the Court enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment "alone" could not reach. Justice Black criticized the Court for siding with
the protesters when, as far as he understood it, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment protected,
through the state action requirement itself, the liberty of property owners to discriminate:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment of itself does not compel either a black man or a white
man running his own private business to trade with anyone else against his will. We do
not believe that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was written or designed to
interfere with a storekeeper's right to choose his customers or with a property owner's
right to choose his social or business associates, so long as he does not run counter to
valid state or federal regulation. The case before us does not involve the power of the
Congress to pass a law compelling privately owned businesses to refrain from
discrimination on the basis of race and to trade with all if they trade with any. We
express no views as to the power of Congress, acting under one or another provision of
the Constitution, to prevent racial discrimination in the operation of privately owned
businesses, nor upon any particular form of legislation to that end. Our sole conclusion
is that Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment, standing alone, does not prohibit
privately owned restaurants from choosing their own customers. It does not destroy
what has until very recently been universally recognized in this country as the
unchallenged right of a man who owns a business to run the business in his own way so
long as some valid regulatory statute does not tell him to do otherwise.
Id. at 342-43 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Black carefully reserved
the question of whether Congress, pursuant to Section 5, must draw the public/private distinction
in the same way as the Court in its own application of Section 1. See also id. at 338 (observing
that there is no cited evidence "to support the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment,
without congressional legislation, prohibits owners of restaurants and other places to refuse
service to Negroes"); id. at 339 ("It should be obvious that what may have been proposed in
connection with passage of one statute or another is altogether irrelevant to the question of what
the Fourteenth Amendment does in the absence of legislation."); cf Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 278-79 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
270. The Court stated:
Since we therefore deal here only with the bare terms of the Equal Protection Clause
itself, nothing said in this opinion goes to the question of what kinds of other and
broader legislation Congress might constitutionally enact under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to implement that Clause or any other provision of the Amendment.
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1966). Justice Brennan, in his separate opinion in
Guest, explicitly embraced the position that Section 5 legislation was not constitutionally required
to correct equal protection violations that were defined by the same standards as those used by
courts to define Section 1 violations. Id. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("A majority of the members of the Court expresses the view today that § 5 empowers
Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of Fourteenth
Amendment rights, whether or not state officers or others acting under the color of state law are
implicated in the conspiracy." (emphasis in original)); id. at 783 n.7 (" Congress, not the judiciary,
was viewed as the more likely agency to implement fully the guarantees of equality, and thus it
could be presumed the primary purpose of the Amendment was to augment the power of
Congress, not the judiciary."); see also District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 n.8
(1973) (dictum).
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legislation could remedy violations that differed from those courts were
empowered to redress pursuant to Section 127i Upon receiving the draft of
the Morgan opinion, Black wrote a personal note to Brennan,
congratulating him on a "historic opinion which for the first time gives § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment the full scope I think it was intended to
have." 272
The Court thus advanced an institutionally differentiated approach to
Section 5 analogous to that which it would later develop in its Thirteenth
Amendment jurisprudence.273 Contemporary commentators read the Court's
Section 5 decisions as implicitly embracing such an approach.2"4 But, in the
end, the Court never definitively resolved the question of whether or how a
state action requirement restrained Congress's power to enact
antidiscrimination legislation under Section 5, perhaps because the
Fourteenth Amendment, unlike the Thirteenth Amendment, concerns such a
wide range of disparate rights that relate in such conceptually distinct ways
271. 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966) (holding that under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress can enact legislation prohibiting enforcement of a state law, even if courts
have not determined that the state law violates the provisions of the Amendment) ("A
construction of § 5 that would require a judicial determination that the enforcement of the state
law precluded by Congress violated the Amendment, as a condition of sustaining the
congressional enactment, would depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and congressional
responsibility for implementing the Amendment. It would confine the legislative power in this
context to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial branch was
prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or of merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by
particularizing the 'majestic generalities' of § 1 of the Amendment.") (citations to historical
accounts of the Fourteenth Amendment invoked in support of the Court's interpretation of
Congress's Section 5 powers omitted).
272. Communication. from Hugo Black, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to William Brennan,
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (May 23, 1966).
273. Supra text accompanying notes 257-260.
274. Certainly Archibald Cox, who as Solicitor General had previously believed that it was
impractical to defend the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on Fourteenth
Amendment, as distinct from Commerce Clause, grounds, read the Morgan and Guest cases in his
Supreme Court Foreword of 1966 as attributing to Congress a special institutional competence
and authority to address the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. He
interpreted the cases as signaling that the Court had begun to exercise judicial review of Section 5
power in deferential terms resembling its approach to federalism questions under the Commerce
Clause:
Here then, as under the commerce clause, in place of the question, what will the Court
permit, the principal issue becomes, how widely should Congress choose to extend
federal regulation. Political opinions upon the wisdom of that transfer of responsibility
[to determine federalism limits under the Commerce Clause] differ widely. In my view
it gave the federal system as a whole the flexibility to satisfy the material needs of its
citizens, without significantly lessening the power of the states to respond. The recent
decisions express a parallel view of congressional responsibility in the area of human
rights.
Cox, supra note 160, at 119. For Cox's view of the 1964 Act, see Seth M. Waxman, Twins at
Birth: Civil Rights and the Role of the Solicitor General, 75 IND. L.J. 1297, 1311-13 (2000). For
another contemporary interpretation of Morgan, see Burt, supra note 65, at 104, which reads
Morgan as "assert[ing] a new constitutional theory of Court-Congress relationships under the
Fourteenth Amendment."
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to the issue of state action.275 Or the Court may simply have been reluctant
to venture into this complex territory when it was uncertain about the state
action requirement of Section 1 and about the exact relationship between
Section 5 and Section 1, and when it could achieve its goal of encouraging
congressional regulation of discrimination by private actors through other
means.
Although we cannot understand the full range of concerns that led the
Court to rely on the Commerce Clause and Section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment to vindicate Congress's power to enact antidiscrimination
legislation during the 1960s-while reserving decision about the scope of
Congress's powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment-this
lingering question should not obscure what is perfectly clear about
the Court's commitment during the 1960s. Through a combination
of interpretive stratagems, the Court decisively freed federal
antidiscrimination legislation from the state action requirement it preserved
for its own Section 1 cases. It encouraged Congress to decide when and
how the federal government would enforce antidiscrimination norms
against private actors-authority Congress exercised in enacting the
violence and housing provisions of the 1968 Civil Rights Act.276 The
Court's deference to Congress helped to consolidate a new consensus about
the federal government's role in enforcing civil rights. By the end of the
decade, Congress, the Court, and the American people all expected the
federal government to lead the fight against discrimination in the public and
private sectors. This is the momentous fact that Morrison ignores by citing
275. The Court may have been concerned about its capacity to confine any decision to relax
or waive state action requirements in exercises of Section 5 power to congressional efforts to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause. For a discussion of the difficulties that may attend relaxing
the state action requirement in the context of other Section 1 rights, see Julian N. Eule & Jonathan
D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the Private Sector: With Every Wish There
Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1537 (1998).
276. Cf. Cox, supra note 160, at 117-18 (reading Morgan and Guest as encouraging Congress
to exercise its authority under Section 5 to regulate racial violence and housing discrimination).
Congress invoked its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Commerce Clause
in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1968. See S. REP. No. 90-721, at 5 (1967) ("[A] majority of
the Justices made it clear that Congress could, under section 5 of the 14th amendment, enact a
statute reaching private conduct denying such rights. H.R. 2516 is such a statute and would-as
six Justices said was constitutionally possible-cover racially motivated acts of violence which do
not involve participation on [sic] connivance of public officials."); H.R. REP. No. 90-473, at 6
(" While the 14th and 15th amendments, of their own force, do not forbid private discrimination in
which no trace of 'State action' is involved, they do expressly authorize Congress to enact
appropriate legislation to 'enforce' their substantive guarantees. The scope of this congressional
power is broad. (South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326-327). It surely comprehends
legislation punishing private persons, who, for racial reasons, engage in acts or threats of violence
that obstruct access on equal terms to the facilities and benefits which a State provides its citizens,
and thereby thwart the attainment of the promise of the 14th and 15th amendments. Any doubt on
this score was laid to rest by the opinions of Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Brennan (speaking
together for six of the nine Justices), in the Guest case ... " ).
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the Civil Rights Cases as an authoritative account of the meaning of
federalism in the context of federal antidiscrimination legislation.
D. Morrison, Civil Rights, and Federalism
No doubt the Court has the raw power to deny this historical
transformation by seeking to revive older notions of federalism. Federalism
is, as we have said, a dynamic system, and since the days of the second
Reconstruction there has certainly been a renewed interest in restricting the
power of the federal government. But the decisive question raised by
Morrison's appeal to federalism is whether the nation has retreated from the
view that a central mission of the federal government is to protect
individuals against discrimination by public and private actors.
The 1960s produced a consensus on this question that was the result of
full and passionate debate. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provoked
sustained public deliberation about the role of the federal government that
fundamentally transformed American traditions of federalism. 7 Americans
now believe that a core function of the federal government is to prohibit
discrimination in the public and private sectors. Morrison simply does not
acknowledge or critically engage this shared public understanding. The
Court's discussion of Section 5 power, in contrast to its treatment of
Commerce Clause power, offers no positive account of the appropriate
relationship between federal and state governments in matters of civil rights
enforcement. Morrison instead invokes rules and tests to cabin Section 5
power in the interests of federalism, assiduously avoiding any discussion of
what role the federal government ought to play in enforcing civil rights.
The Court reaches back to the nineteenth century to invoke the Civil Rights
Cases for the view that it would threaten the "balance of power between the
States and the National Government" '78 for Congress to regulate the
conduct of private actors under the Fourteenth Amendment.
But Morrison never evaluates this nineteenth-century understanding,
descriptively or prescriptively, in terms of the constitutional arrangements
of the twentieth century. Morrison never explains why, if it is compatible
with the proper balance of power between the states and the national
government for Congress pervasively to regulate discrimination by private
actors by exercising its powers under the Commerce Clause or the
277. Cf 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 137 (1991) (arguing that it
was the "escalating political struggle against institutional racism"-in part precipitated by
Brown-that "enabl[ed] the Presidency and Congress of the mid-1960's finally to transform the
embattled judicial pronunciamentos of the mid-1950's into the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and
1968 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965," and so retroactively to imbue Brown with the
significance of documents "that express the considered judgments of We the People").
278. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1755 (2000).
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Thirteenth Amendment, it is not also compatible with this balance of power
for Congress to regulate such discrimination by private actors as is deemed
necessary and proper to remedy violations of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Of course the nature of any such explanation would depend on what
Morrison actually holds. Morrison is notably ambiguous about whether it
imposes a per se rule categorically forbidding Section 5 legislation from
regulating private parties, or whether it instead requires a case-by-case
inquiry into the "congruence and proportionality" of Section 5 legislation
with respect to an underlying Section 1 violation.
Interpreted as imposing a per se rule forbidding Section 5 legislation
from regulating private parties, Morrison is a hugely consequential
decision. Read in this way, Morrison would erect a sharp and arbitrary
barrier against federal efforts to remedy the effects of Section 1 violations,
a barrier lacking warrant in precedent, either in the Civil Rights Cases or in
Boerne itself.279 To justify imposing this new per se restriction on
Congress's use of its Section 5 power to enforce antidiscrimination norms
against private actors, the Court would have to offer a normative account of
the proper purposes of the federal government, the persuasive force of
which would depend on shared understandings about the legitimate role of
the national government. Yet, as we have seen, the struggles that led to the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 produced a consensus, which
lasts to this day, about the propriety of the federal government enforcing
antidiscrimination norms against private actors. Morrison neither addresses
nor contests this consensus, as any opinion seeking to alter the national
government's role in enforcing civil rights would have to do.
Interpreting Morrison as imposing a per se restriction on Congress's
powers to enforce antidiscrimination norms against private actors would not
only constitute a major challenge to popular conceptions of the federal
government's role, but would also represent a significant break with the
Court's own approach to reviewing exercises of Section 5 power. During
the 1960s, Congress claimed authority to enact antidiscrimination statutes
by invoking its power under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court did not
reject this claim. Instead it encouraged Congress to enact antidiscrimination
legislation, while systematically refusing to decide whether various statutes
applying antidiscrimination norms to private actors could be justified by
Section 5.280 The Court's reticence was too persistent to be anything but
279. For an argument against any such per se rule, see Evan H. Caminker, Private Remedies
for Public Wrongs Under Section 5,33 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1351 (2000).
280. On congressional assertions of power, see supra notes 22, 25, 276. The Court has
repeatedly refused to decide the question. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S.
299, 306 n.12 (1977) ("Their petition for certiorari and brief on the merits did raise a second
question: 'Whether Congress has authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
prohibit by Title VHI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 employment practices of an agency of a state
2000]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 110: 441
deliberate. Its repeated refusal to clarify the relationship between these
antidiscrimination statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment preserved a
certain useful ambiguity about the status of these statutes as well as about
the state action requirement of the Equal Protection Clause. Were the Court
in Morrison now to hold that Section 5 power can never reach private
actors, it would both radically expand the reach of the Civil Rights Cases
and cut off the Civil Rights Act of 1964 from the Fourteenth Amendment,
categorizing the statute for the first time as "merely" a market regulation,
constitutionally rooted only in the economic concerns of the Commerce
Clause.
Plainly this is not how the statute was understood, either by the Court
or by Congress, at the time of its enactment or in the ensuing decades. No
one at the time had the slightest doubt but that the antidiscrimination
statutes enacted by Congress during the 1960s were implementing the
equality norms of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 28 ' That is why
the Court could interpret Title VII in terms that readily and unself-
consciously evoked the constitutional standards of the Equal Protection
Clause.82 This view of the statute enabled the Court in 1976 easily to
government in the absence of proof that the agency purposefully discriminated against applicants
on the basis of race.' That issue, however, is not presented by the facts of this case."); Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 n.15 (1974) (deciding whether jury trials are required under the fair
housing title of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and stating that "[wie therefore have no occasion to
consider in this case any question of the scope of congressional power to enforce § 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.
88, 107 (1971) (discussing the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994), which prohibits
conspiracies to interfere with civil rights and stating that '"the allegations of the complaint in this
case have not required consideration of the scope of the power of Congress under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment"); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1966) (reviewing an
indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964), which criminalizes conspiracies against "the free
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the
United States" and stating that "[slince we therefore deal here only with the bare terms of the
Equal Protection Clause itself, nothing said in this opinion goes to the question of what kinds of
other and broader legislation Congress might constitutionally enact under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment"); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (deciding the
constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and stating that "we have therefore not
considered the other grounds relied upon. This is not to say that the remaining authority upon
which [Congress] acted was not adequate, a question upon which we do not pass, but merely that
since the commerce power is sufficient for our decision here we have considered it alone").
Contra Guest, 383 U.S. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("A
majority of the members of the Court expresses the view today that § 5 empowers Congress to
enact laws punishing all conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of Fourteenth Amendment
rights, whether or not state officers or others acting under the color of state law are implicated in
the conspiracy.").
281. It is surely relevant for this point that Congress itself persisted in justifying these statutes
by reference to its power under Section 5. For a discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see
supra note 22. Congress also asserted Section 5 power in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
Supra note 276.
282. For example, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the Court held
that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not discrimination on the basis of sex under
Title VII by applying to Title VII the reasoning of a case interpreting the Equal Protection Clause
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approve Congress's wholesale extension of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 to the states as "an appropriate method of enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment" under Section 5.283 Indeed, it was not until 1976 that the
Court first sought explicitly to differentiate judicial interpretations of
Section 1 from the standards used to interpret Title VII.284
If one takes seriously the Fourteenth Amendment concerns that
prompted the enactment and interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as well as the Fourteenth Amendment concerns that seem to have animated
the Court's reluctance to hold that the statute was an exercise of Congress's
Section 5 power, then proper constitutional characterization of the statute
(and of other antidiscrimination legislation of the second Reconstruction)
remains fraught with difficulties. The Court's repeated reservation of the
Section 5 question in cases involving legislative application of equality
norms to private actors can be interpreted as expressing a deep appreciation
of the complex Fourteenth Amendment issues that statutes like the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 embody. For this very reason, it would be a dramatic
step, of both expressive and practical consequence, for the Court now
unequivocally to cut a statute like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 adrift from
the Fourteenth Amendment antidiscrimination tradition initiated by Brown,
whose equality norms played so central a role in its enactment and
interpretation, and to insist that the Act is a mere market regulation enacted
under the Commerce Clause.285
Taken together, these are momentous consequences to attribute to an
opinion as terse, as casual, as undeveloped as Morrison. Surely we are
entitled to a more explicit and considered explication of these weighty
issues from an opinion that would alter more than a century of Section 5
jurisprudence by holding for the first time that Section 5 legislation can
have no application to private actors, and that would closely confine almost
fifty years of federal antidiscrimination law by holding for the first time that
its norms can have no constitutional relevance for private actors. There is
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 132-40 (applying to Title VII the reasoning of Geduldig
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)). As Justice Rehnquist explained:
The concept of "discrimination," of course, was well known at the time of the
enactment of Title VII, having been associated with the Fourteenth Amendment for
nearly a century, and carrying with it a long history of judicial construction. When
Congress makes it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate ... because
of... sex .... " without further explanation of its meaning, we should not readily infer
that it meant something different from what the concept of discrimination has
traditionally meant.
Id. at 145.
283. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980); see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445 (1976).
284. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); see also In re Employment
Discrimination Litig. Against Alabama, 198 F.3d 1305, 1319 n.17 (11 th Cir. 1999).
285. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 201-02
(13th ed. 1997) (quoting a letter from Gerald Gunther to the United States Department of Justice).
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thus good reason for interpreting Morrison as mandating an inquiry into the
congruence and proportionality of Section 5 laws that regulate private
actors, rather than as imposing a per se rule categorically barring use of
Section 5 power to regulate private parties.
A test of congruence and proportionality would mandate case-by-case
inquiry into the question of whether Section 5 power may be used to
regulate the conduct of private actors. Rather than defining a distinct sphere
of private action that must remain free from federal regulation, the test
would focus judicial attention on whether federal regulation is an
appropriate means of redressing particular Section 1 violations that
Congress is otherwise authorized to remedy. This use of the congruence and
proportionality test would be distinct from Kimel's deployment of the test,
because its purpose would not be to ensure that Section 5 legislation is
remedial. Its purpose would instead be to protect the values of federalism
by restricting undue federal interference with states and private actors. The
question of what federal interference should be regarded as "undue" would
depend upon two questions: the precise values of federalism the test is
designed to safeguard, and the Court's apprehension of the proper role of
the federal government in remedying unconstitutional discrimination.
Morrison, however, does not discuss either question.
We can offer a preliminary analysis of the federalism question by
observing that Section 5 legislation characteristically raises two distinct
kinds of federalism concerns. The first focuses on protecting the states as
sovereigns from intrusive federal regulation. Section 5 legislation typically
regulates the states themselves, and protecting state legislatures and
administrative agencies from direct federal "commandeering" 
286 has been a
central theme of the Court's contemporary revival of federalism. But
however pressing this concern may be for the current Court, it is not one
that can explain the Court's use of the congruence and proportionality test
to strike down VAWA's civil rights remedy in Morrison. Title III of the
Violence Against Women Act was specifically crafted to remedy the effects
of discriminatory state criminal justice systems without directly regulating
states. It thus posed no threat whatever to state sovereignty.287
Section 5 legislation is frequently thought to raise a second kind of
federalism concern, however, which is that the federal government might
exercise a general police power and prescribe "uniform national laws with
286. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997).
287. Indeed, Morrison's insistence that Congress use its Section 5 power to regulate state
actors would seem to imply that Congress would have been on stronger constitutional footing if it
had undertaken directly to regulate states whose criminal justice systems failed to protect women
from assault to the same extent that they protected men. This is a highly counterintuitive outcome
from the perspective of safeguarding states from federal regulation.
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respect to life, liberty, and property. 288 Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment contains a vast array of rights which, when taken together,
permeate virtually every aspect of American life. Morrison's use of the
congruence and proportionality test may be designed to allay the fear,
explicitly articulated by the Court since the days of the Slaughter-House
Cases, that the states might be overwhelmed and engulfed in the maw of
congressional Section 5 legislation that would appropriate to the federal
government "the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging
exclusively to the States." 2 89 The grip of this fear is diffuse and pervasive,
provoking suspicion of the very existence of Section 5 power.
We submit, however, that this view of Section 5 power is an untenable
basis on which to premise judicial review of the national government's
legislative power in a constitutional democracy. A more discriminating
approach is required, one capable of discerning the elementary point that all
forms of Section 5 legislation are not the same. The values of federalism are
context-specific.
The precise question raised by Morrison is how this concern about the
potentially overbroad scope of federal power should be evaluated in the
particular context of antidiscrimination legislation. This question comes to
us freighted with a history of struggle and contest. The Congress that
passed the Fourteenth Amendment knew that it could not establish equality
for the newly freed slaves without reaching deep into Southern society and
reforming its fundamental principles. That is why it drafted Section 5. But
the Supreme Court, fearing a disruption of the balance of the federal
system, refused to allow this exercise of federal power,29 and instead
288. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 523 (1997). For a good statement of the
problem, see Jesse H. Choper, Congressional Power To Expand Judicial Definitions of the
Substantive Terms of the Civil War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REv. 299, 303-07 (1982).
289. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1872).
290. In the words of Justice Brennan:
Stirred to action by the wholesale breakdown of protection of civil rights in the South,
Congress carried to completion the creation of a comprehensive scheme of remnedies-
civil, criminal, and military-for the protection of constitutional rights from all major
interference.
The history of this scheme of remedies for the protection of civil rights was, until
very recently, one of virtual nullification by this Court. Key provisions were declared
unconstitutional or given an unduly narrow construction wholly out of keeping with
their purposes.
Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 205-06 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted). Legal historians are divided in their assessment of this
tumultuous period of constitutional development and the Court's performance in it. For one recent
overview of the literature, see Michael Les Benedict, Constitutional History and Constitutional
Theory: Reflections on Ackerman, Reconstruction, and the Transformation of the American
Constitution, 108 YALE L.J. 201, 2028-35 (1999); and compare BRANDWEIN, supra note 237,
which traces the connections between historiography and jurisprudence in debates over the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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created doctrines that shielded the right of state legal systems to segregate
and the freedom of private property owners to discriminate.
Even after the gates of federal power were thrown open during the New
Deal, it was still not clear whether the national government had the power
to overcome these deeply inbred practices and principles of discrimination.
It was not until Brown changed the standards of Section 1 that this objective
became imaginable. And even then, it was not until thousands of protests
forced the federal hand that Congress was finally willing to enact the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to accomplish what the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment thought they had achieved.
When we speak of using the values of federalism to restrict the scope of
federal power in the context of national antidiscrimination statutes,
therefore, we are speaking of a trust put into federal hands by the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment, taken away by the Court for almost a
century, but, after struggle, returned to national authority in the 1960s. This
assumption of federal authority was vindicated by all three branches of the
federal government. The question of federalism thus merges with the
question of the federal government's proper role in combating
discrimination. For whatever might be said about Section 5 power
generally, the use of Section 5 power to combat unconstitutional
discrimination cannot be conceived as a potential threat to the legitimate
balance of the federal system so long as this history retains its normative
force.
Morrison was apparently unwilling explicitly to challenge this
consensus understanding. It refused to acknowledge, much less to criticize,
the role the federal government has played in remedying discrimination
during the last half of the twentieth century. The opinion offered no
plausible alternative account of the proper role of the federal government in
enforcing civil rights. It did not argue, for example, that the consensus of
the 1960s concerned only the role of the federal government in redressing
racial discrimination, rather than protecting broader norms of equality. It
did not even claim that this consensus extended only to the specific forms
of discrimination prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Any such
view of our national commitments would be highly controversial, of course,
but at least it would articulate the actual set of national equality values that
the Court was prepared to permit Congress to implement pursuant to
Section 5. Without such an explanation, Morrison's deployment of the
congruence and proportionality test can only be arbitrary.
If the test is meant to prevent the federal government from assuming
the unwarranted prerogatives of a general police power, then the test must
distinguish federal antidiscrimination legislation that is compatible with the
proper role of the federal government from that which is not. The Boerne
test performs this function by postulating that the proper role of the federal
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government is to "remedy" infringements of Section 1; it invalidates
antidiscrimination legislation that is inconsistent with this role. But because
Morrison is decided on the assumption that § 13981 is properly remedial
within the meaning of Boerne, we may infer that Morrison's redeployment
of the congruence and proportionality test is designed to express some other
view about the appropriate role of Congress in using Section 5 power.
Until this view is made explicit, however, Morrison's congruence and
proportionality test will remain capricious.
The only hint that Morrison provides about possible limitations of the
federal government's role in enforcing antidiscrimination law lies in its
discussion of the Commerce Clause, where the Court emphatically
distinguishes between the "truly national" sphere of commercial relations
and "truly local" spheres like education, family, or criminal law.29' But
whatever relevance this distinction might have for Commerce Clause
purposes, it has none for purposes of the struggle against discrimination.2 92
Although marriage and intrastate crime are archetypal examples of what
Morrison's Commerce Clause discussion regards as truly local, we do not
read Morrison as calling into question the Court's decision in Loving v.
Virginia, 3 which struck down a state law criminalizing interracial
marriage.
Loving did not threaten to endow the federal judiciary with general
regulatory authority over marriage or criminal law; it instead corrected a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Section 5 legislation should be
regarded in the same way. If the judiciary is not prevented by federalism
from enforcing the Equal Protection Clause in areas of traditional state
regulation, why should Congress be differently constrained? If marriage
or violence is the site of discrimination that violates the Fourteenth
Amendment, we are hard-pressed to imagine a normatively cogent account
of federalism or of the national government's proper role in enforcing civil
rights that would restrict the federal government from remedying or
deterring such discrimination. That Section 5 legislation may regulate areas
in which states retain primary or concurrent regulatory authority is simply
immaterial.
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE MODERN CIVIL RIGHTS TRADITION
In Part III, we discussed federalism constraints on Section 5 legislation
that remedies unconstitutional discrimination. In this Part of our Essay, we
take up once again the prior and more fundamental question of how a court
291. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1754 (2000).
292. Supra text accompanying notes 38-39, 204-208.
293. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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should exercise its discretion to determine what ought to count as
unconstitutional discrimination that Congress is authorized to prevent or
remedy under Section 5. We can now pursue this inquiry in a manner that
takes account of both federalism and separation-of-powers concerns, and
that is informed by the actual historical development of our civil rights
tradition.
We argued in Part I that Congress can enforce the Equal Protection
Clause in ways that are different from courts without endangering Boerne's
concern that the Court retain the authority in the last instance to say "what
the law is." But we also noted that neither Boerne nor Kimel specifies the
degree of congruence and proportionality that will be demanded of
Section 5 legislation. In part this is a question of how prophylactic the
Court will permit such legislation to become,"9 how tightly it will require
congressional means to be tied to legitimate congressional ends. But if the
Court can authorize Congress to apply standards that the Court itself will
not enforce under Section 1, the question of congruence and proportionality
must also be understood to raise the larger issue of how closely the Court
should tie Section 5 legislation to the Court's own implementation of the
Equal Protection Clause. Should the Court narrowly tailor such legislation
to the terms of the Court's own decisions enforcing the Clause, or should it
instead generously interpret the criteria of congruence and proportionality
in order to allow Congress space to remedy violations of the Clause that the
Court is itself unwilling to enforce? In this Part of our Essay, we first
consider whether courts should vindicate federalism values in applying the
congruence and proportionality test to determine the kinds of constitutional
violations Congress may remedy under Section 5. We then analyze how the
institutional history of the modem civil rights tradition discussed in Part III
illuminates the separation-of-powers values at stake in the application of the
Boerne test.
A. Identifying Constitutional Violations That Justify Section 5 Authority:
Federalism
In Boerne and Kimel, the Court justifies the congruence and
proportionality test as a doctrinal tool for distinguishing between remedial
and substantive exercises of Section 5 power. But there is something
strange about this justification. The criteria of congruence and
proportionality seem an odd and awkward way to distinguish legislation
enacted for the purpose of remedying violations of the Equal Protection
Clause from legislation enacted for the purpose of defining the substantive
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. As the second half of the Kimel
294. See supra note 93.
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opinion illustrates, a court that wishes to discover congressional purpose is
perfectly capable of asking the question directly and simply.295 It is true that
the Court has sometimes used the technique of narrow tailoring to "flush
out" improper motivation,296 but it has done so only when there is
antecedent reason to suspect that legislation may be animated by
unconstitutional purposes, and where there is reason to suspect that
a lawmaker will conceal its true motivations. Neither assumption
seems justifiable in the context of ordinary Section 5 antidiscrimination
legislation.297
Boerne's congruence and proportionality test thus appears to impose
greater restrictions on Section 5 legislation than can be justified by a strict
focus on legislative intent. Both Morrison and Kimel have displayed the
tendency to allow the Boerne test to slide into a kind of narrow tailoring, as
if even Section 5 legislation enacted for a proper purpose must nevertheless
be shown to be a "carefully delimited" remediation of an appropriate
constitutional violation.29 This tendency is certainly manifest in lower court
cases applying Boerne.299 It is fair to infer, therefore, that the test is
performing some function in addition to that of determining whether
Congress's goal is to remedy violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.
There is some evidence that in both Boerne and Kimel the Court
imagines the congruence and proportionality test as imposing a form of
narrow tailoring that is singularly applicable to Section 5 power. This may
represent the Court's worry that Section 5, unique among positive grants of
congressional legislative power, carries the potential to enable Congress to
prescribe "uniform national laws with respect to life, liberty, and
property."" This is essentially the same concern that we have already
analyzed with respect to Morrison; it rests on the fear that Section 5 may
spawn a general federal police power. But this concern is no more cogent in
the context of Boerne and Kimel than it is in the context of Morrison.
Section 5 antidiscrimination legislation that is remedial, that seeks to
correct infringements of the Equal Protection Clause, does not threaten to
generate unchecked federal power. It merely fulfills the federal
295. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
296. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 145-48 (1980).
297. The ADEA, for example, seems to have been a perfectly run-of-the-mill
antidiscrimination statute whose application to the states had even been approved by the Court.
See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983). There was no reason to suspect either that Congress
was concealing its purposes or that these purposes, at the time of the statute's enactment, were
unconstitutional.
298. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672
(1999); see, e.g., I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 959 (3d ed. 2000)
("Laws enacted by Congress pursuant to § 5 [have] suddenly been saddled with something
between intermediate and strict scrutiny .... ").
299. See, e.g., Kazmier v. Widman, 225 F.3d 519, 523-24, 529-30 (5th Cir. 2000).
300. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 523 (1997).
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government's legitimate role in combating unconstitutional discrimination.
The question of whether Section 5 legislation is in fact properly remedial is
not itself an issue of federalism. Instead it is a substantive question of
Fourteenth Amendment law, as refracted through the lens of separation of
powers that focuses on the correct relationship between Congress and the
Court in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.
Boerne and Kimel do, however, raise a federalism concern that is not
present in Morrison. RFRA, like the ADEA, regulated the states in their
sovereign capacities. RFRA imposed far-reaching burdens on state
legislation,30' while the ADEA dictated conditions of state employment.
Because Section 5 power, like the enforcement provisions of the other
Reconstruction amendments, is directed against the states themselves, it
might be thought to create serious potential for overreaching federal
regulation of states. This theme, of course, carries special resonance for the
contemporary Court; indeed, one might even say that, having worked so
hard in Seminole Tribe to establish state Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suits predicated upon federal commerce power, the Court was not
about to cede to Congress free rein to override that immunity under Section
5. The congruence and proportionality test might thus be interpreted to
require narrow tailoring so that the Court can strictly scrutinize
congressional legislation directly burdening states.3"2
The difficulty with this use of the Boerne test, however, is that the
Fourteenth Amendment has been recognized from the day of its adoption as
sanctioning a great "shift in the federal-state balance" by authorizing
"intrusions by Congress... into the judicial, executive, and legislative
spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States."303
The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to
the States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power. It is
these which Congress is empowered to enforce, and to enforce
against State action, however put forth, whether that action be
executive, legislative, or judicial. Such enforcement is no invasion
of State sovereignty. No law can be, which the people of the States
have, by the Constitution of the United States, empowered
Congress to enact."
301. Thus Boerne observed that RFRA "is a considerable congressional intrusion into the
States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their
citizens." Id. at 534.
302. Boerne noted that "[tihe substantial costs RFRA exacts, both in practical terms of
imposing a heavy litigation burden on the States and in terms of curtailing their traditional general
regulatory power, far exceed any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free
Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith." Id. at 534.
303. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976).
304. Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880).
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It is no wonder, then, that neither Boerne nor Kimel explicitly defends
the position that the function of the congruence and proportionality test is to
protect states from undue regulation by Congress. It would be anomalous,
to say the least, for the Court to use the Boerne test to restrict as "undue"
otherwise legitimate exercises of congressional power in order to protect
precisely the values of state sovereignty that a constitutional grant of
congressional power is expressly designed to override. That is why in the
end both Boerne and Kimel are driven to justify their holdings on the
grounds that congressional legislation is outside the "sphere of power and
responsibilities" assigned to Congress by Section 5.3"5
B. Identifying Constitutional Violations That Justify Section 5 Authority:
Separation of Powers
If the narrow tailoring of the Boerne test is to be justified, therefore, it
must be because separation of powers requires that Congress's proper
"sphere of power and responsibilities" be strictly confined to enforcing the
Court's own Section 1 doctrine, so as to preserve judicial authority over
"the ultimate interpretation and determination of the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive meaning." " The history of the second
Reconstruction that we discussed in Part III offers a useful framework for
evaluating this view of separation of powers. It suggests that the Court's
effort to tie closely Section 5 antidiscrimination legislation to the ways that
courts enforce Section 1 is fundamentally misguided.
To understand why this might be so, consider how the meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause has historically been established. Contemporary
equal protection jurisprudence does not flow from the abstract and delphic
words of the Clause; nor does it derive from the original intent of the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause, perhaps more than most constitutional guarantees, is tied
in complex ways to evolving and contested social norms. As social
understandings of equality have developed, so, too, have the constitutional
requirements of the Clause, which might thus be understood as articulating
general principles whose particular application to specific contexts must be
determined "on the ground of history and of common knowledge about the
facts of life."307 Brown, for example, "burst asunder the shackles of original
intent" ' in order to express its own appreciation of the "present" nature of
305. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535.
306. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 644 (2000).
307. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (quoting Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions,
69 YALE L.J. 421,427 (1960)).
308. Klarman, supra note 264, at 253.
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"American life throughout the Nation."'30 The explosive growth of equal
protection jurisprudence in the years after Brown, a growth that has
produced doctrine that would have been unimaginable to the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment, illustrates how thoroughly the Clause has absorbed
altered understandings of equality.
The Court explicitly ties equal protection jurisprudence to changing
social norms when it asks whether sex-based classifications are "reflective
of 'archaic and overbroad' generalizations about gender.., or based on
'outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females.""'31 Cases
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause incorporate evolving social
understandings when they scrutinize sex-based classifications to determine
if they "create or perpetuate the... social ... inferiority of women," 311 or
when they review racial classifications to determine if they demean "the
dignity and worth of a person,"312 or if they reflect "racial prejudice" as
distinct from "legitimate public concerns." '313 These inquiries require
contextual judgments that are necessarily steeped in particular normative
understandings and controversies." 4 At each moment in history, the Court
must select from a field of evolving and contested social understandings an
account of what the Constitution requires.
This practice of interpretation is both responsive and directive. In a
complex and heterogeneous society like the United States, the values of
equality that might be brought to bear on the resolution of any difficult
constitutional question are too diverse and contested for the Court merely
and passively to "reflect" the social understandings of the nation whose
Constitution it is interpreting. Yet the limited character of the Court's own
institutional authority also precludes the possibility that the Court can
unilaterally construct social meanings for the nation whose charter of
governance it expounds.
When the Court articulates its constitutional vision of what equality
demands, therefore, it gives institutionally mediated expression to social
norms in a manner that neither fully reflects nor fully remakes the ambient
309. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).
310. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994) (citations omitted); see also
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 745 (1984); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
725 (1982).
311. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996).
312. Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044, 1057 (2000). On the essential dependence of
"dignity" upon changing social norms, see ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS:
DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 180-84 (1995).
313. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
314. For a discussion of the relationship between antidiscrimination law and ambient social
norms of equality, see Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1 (2000); Robert Post, Response to Commentators,
88 CAL. L. REv. 119 (2000); and Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How
"Color Blindness " Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REv. 77
(2000).
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culture. In interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Court represents the
nation's social understandings to the nation for adoption into the fabric of
the nation's collective self-accountings.315 This practice of representation
can sometimes help to form the very tradition, the very complex of social
norms and values, that in the end will validate the Court's vision as a living
and vibrant interpretation of the Constitution. Or it may fail, exposing the
Court as an institution that is morally adrift, blind to the vision and deaf to
the voice of the people whose Constitution it would interpret. 16
The Court's authority to interpret the Equal Protection Clause thus
depends on more than a mastery of complex precedents or an insularity
from political passions. It rests on a special kind of socially situated
judgment, a capacity to discern shifts in the ways Americans understand the
practices and institutions that organize American life, and an ability to
speak from and to those evolving and contested understandings. Considered
from this vantage point, the Court's authority to interpret the Equal
Protection Clause is always contingent.
Nothing better illustrates this than Brown itself. Brown forced the
nation to confront a new and compelling vision of equal citizenship under
the Fourteenth Amendment. But the Court, acting by itself, was unable to
bring the nation to embrace the commitments it had expressed in Brown. As
Judge Wisdom famously observed, "[tihe courts acting alone have
failed." 3 17 It was only with the intervention of Congress and the Executive
Branch in 1964 that the vision announced in Brown began to become a
living constitutional reality.318
315. Of course, as the Court undertakes to speak to and for the nation, the Court can
reproduce and rationalize various forms of inequality amongst the social groups that compose the
nation. Cf. Siegel, supra note 314, at 114-16; Siegel, supra note 149, at 2179-84. For an analysis
of this dynamic in constitutional interpretation within a collective memory framework, see Reva
B. Siegel, Collective Memory and the Nineteenth Amendment: Reasoning About "the Woman
Question" in the Discourse of Sex Discrimination, in HISTORY, MEMORY, AND THE LAW (Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Keams eds., 1999).
316. For a discussion, see Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30
REPRESENTATIONS 13, 23-30 (1990).
317. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 847 (5th Cir. 1966), affd
en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967); cf. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 52 (1991) ("The numbers show that the Supreme Court
contributed virtually nothing to ending segregation of the public schools in the Southern states in
the decade following Brown."). For a comprehensive discussion, see ROSENBERG, supra, at 39-
157.
318. Judge Wisdom's discussion in Jefferson County is exemplary. Judge Wisdom welcomed
the Guidelines of the U.S. Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
designed to implement Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as an immense and necessary
assistance in finally achieving the school desegregation constitutionally mandated by Brown.
"Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964... was not only appropriate and proper legislation
under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments; it was necessary to rescue school
desegregation from the bog in which it had been trapped for ten years." Jefferson County,
372 F.2d at 856. ROSENBERG, supra note 317, argues that the Court's ineffectiveness extended
not only to school desegregation, but also to transportation, housing, and public facilities and
accommodations.
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This was not merely because Congress and the President possessed
enforcement powers that the Court lacked. More deeply it was because
"[i]nstitutions and social structures throughout America reflected a history
of, if not a present commitment to, racial discrimination. Cultural barriers to
civil rights had to be overcome before change could occur." '319 The Court,
acting alone, could not overcome these deeply entrenched social norms. It
could inspire and illuminate, and perhaps spark forms of political
mobilization that would pressure the democratically representative branches
of government to act. But it required the involvement of the representative
branches of the federal government to entrench Brown in ways that would
allow the values of the case to survive and prevail.
The image of a courageous Court standing tall in support of Brown,
exemplified perhaps by the Court's decision in Cooper v. Aaron32 -an
image that no doubt underwrites the interpretive authority asserted by the
Court in Boerne-does not begin to capture the full complexity of the
process by which the equality norms of Brown were integrated into the
constitutional sensibility of the nation. However crucial may have been the
Court's readiness to assert its authority in the face of popular resistance, the
principles articulated in Brown were not vindicated, and could not have
been vindicated, merely by confrontations like the one at Little Rock. What
was required instead was affirmative popular comprehension and
commitment.
In the early 1960s, with resistance to Brown unchecked and a docket
full of appeals from sit-in convictions, the Court understood that it was in a
precarious position. The decisions of the Warren Court plainly were guided
by the view that the effective implementation of Brown, much less the
extension of its norms beyond the school segregation context as protesters
were urging, required the participation of the representative branches. As
Archibald Cox observed in 1966:
A Supreme Court decision reversing the conviction of the sit-in
demonstrators upon the ground that the fourteenth amendment
required the keepers of places of public accommodation to serve
Negroes without discrimination or segregation could never have
commanded the same degree of assent as the equal public
accommodations title of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 .... In this
sense, the principle of Brown v. Board of Education became more
319. ROSENBERG, supra note 317, at 82; see, e.g., Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 138 F.
Supp. 337, 342 (E.D. La. 1956) ("The problem of changing a people's mores, particularly those
with an emotional overlay, is not to be taken lightly." (Wright, J.)), affd, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.
1957).
320. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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firmly law after its incorporation into title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964."'
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court looked to Congress as an
indispensable partner in the project of making its vision of the Fourteenth
Amendment "more firmly law" during the 1960s. Not only was Congress
better able than the Court to mobilize and solidify public support for
disestablishing public and private practices of apartheid in the market, but
in so doing, Congress could actually relieve the pressure on the Court's
own enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause. Even as prominent
commentators like Charles Black called the Court to task, urging that
"'[s]eparate but equal' and 'no state action' [are] fraternal twins.. . the
Medusan caryatids upholding racial injustice," 32 2 the Court was able to
proceed cautiously during the 1960s precisely because it could rely on
Congress to determine how to apply antidiscrimination norms to the
practices of private actors.
Archibald Cox was prescient about the potential consequences of this
institutionally differentiated strategy for interpreting and enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment:
It will be interesting to see whether last Term's emphasis upon
congressional power to promote Equality foreshadows greater
judicial restraint in pushing forward the frontiers of the fourteenth
amendment.... [T]he very recognition of a sort of "buffer zone"
in which Congress has discretion to define equal protection or due
process, even though the Court itself might not judge the particular
state policies unconstitutional, may make the arguments for judicial
restraint in applying those provisions a good deal more persuasive
than when the Court was seemingly forced to render the only
decision upon whether the state's action either was or was not
unconstitutional.323
In retrospect, it is clear that the enactment of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964
and 1968, and the revival of the civil rights acts of the first Reconstruction,
did reduce the insistent demand on the Court to liberalize its Section 1 state
action doctrine. This legislation provided an alternative source of law for
plaintiffs who sought to challenge racial segregation in accommodations,
employment, and housing, as well as the practices of violence sometimes
321. Cox, supra note 160, at 94; cf ACKERMAN, supra note 277, at 137 (arguing that it was
because "Brown became a symbol energizing a multiracial coalition of blacks and whites into an
escalating political struggle against institutionalized racism" that "Brown came to possess the
kind of numinous legal authority that is.. . uniquely associated with legal documents that express
the considered judgments of We the People").
322. Black, supra note 264, at 70.
323. Cox, supra note 160, at 121.
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used to enforce this segregation. Over time, the availability of federal
antidiscrimination statutes allowed the Court to restrict judicial enforcement
of Section 1, secure in the belief that congressional legislation would
provide relatively full implementation of antidiscrimination norms.
As such legislation became an accepted and normal feature of the
American landscape, the Court could start self-consciously to differentiate
between constitutional and statutory antidiscrimination standards. But, even
as the Court in 1976 in Washington v. Davis324 began for the first time to
distinguish explicitly between the standards of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and those of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it never lost this
sense of inner connection between the Act and the constitutional enterprise
inaugurated by Brown. The Court in Davis never thought to say that the
reason why the 1964 Act could reach disparate impact, whereas Section 1
required findings of discriminatory purpose, was because the Act was
merely an exercise of the commerce power. Instead it said that courts, as
unrepresentative institutions within a democracy, were ill-equipped to
assess the complex polycentric questions raised by efforts to equalize
discriminatory effects. It is in fact not until this last Term in Kimel that the
Court has been prepared to say explicitly that a federal antidiscrimination
statute is "merely" an exercise of Commerce Clause power, as though the
statute were not connected in any way to the project of making the
principles of Brown "more finnly law."
Looking back at the ways in which the Court and Congress interacted at
the inception of the modem civil rights tradition, we see forms of
institutional cooperation and interdependency that are unaccounted for in
Boerne's static and simple account of their constitutionally mandated
relationship. The equal protection norms of Brown became "more firmly
law" only when ratified by a popular support and commitment that the
Court by itself was unable to summon. The Court required the assistance
of the representative branches of government to establish constitutional
values of equality. The project of entrenching Brown demanded that the
Court recognize Congress as indispensable for the elaboration and
institutionalization of constitutional norms.
As Congress began to participate in the enforcement of equality values,
it brought to the task its own distinctive institutional energies and
capacities. As an elected legislature, for example, Congress was more open
to popular conceptions of equality. That is why it was able to perceive the
gravity of sex discrimination before the Court was prepared to recognize its
harms.325 Because Congress possessed forms of governance authority the
Court did not, Congress was willing and able to reach deeply into the lives
324. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
325. See infra notes 327-333.
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of American citizens, in ways that the Court had traditionally used the state
action requirement to avoid. Because Congress possessed the authority to
create comprehensive and detailed legislative frameworks, as the Court did
not, Congress could tackle polycentric problems of redistribution, like those
entailed by a disparate impact standard, even as the Court shied away from
implementing such a standard in its own Section 1 jurisprudence.326
These disparities were the readily foreseeable consequence of enlisting
the support of Congress in making the equality values of Brown "more
firmly law." They arose because Congress apprehended and applied the
constitutional values of the Fourteenth Amendment antidiscrimination
tradition in a manner that was shaped by its distinctive characteristics as a
legislative body enforcing constitutional norms. From the perspective of the
framework announced in Boerne, these disparities register only as potential
threats to the Court's "ultimate" control over the meaning of the
Constitution. In Part II, we suggested that these disparities need not
constitute threats, because the Court can conceptualize them as forms of
constitutional rights appropriate to congressional, rather than judicial
enforcement. But the history of the 1960s suggests a deeper and more
fundamental understanding.
Boerne assumes that the creation of constitutional meaning is divorced
from political and social life. It imagines a world in which the Court
pronounces constitutional values and the country merely obeys. But our
review of the second Reconstruction suggests that this is a historically
incomplete picture. Once we view the articulation and institutionalization
of equal protection doctrine as an ongoing process that depends
on the interaction between constitutional values and social norms, two
propositions follow.
First, the Court will sometimes require the assistance of Congress to
succeed in the very task of constitutional interpretation that Boerne seeks to
safeguard. This assistance was necessary in order to sustain the interpretive
authority of Brown.327 Implicit in such assistance are institutional disparities
of perspective and approach. If these disparities are spumed and discarded
in the name of maintaining ultimate judicial control over the meaning of the
Constitution, the Court risks failing to make its own constitutional vision
"more firmly law." In such circumstances, to read the Boerne test to
require a strict form of narrow tailoring would be actually to endanger the
Court's own interpretive authority.
326. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes, supra note 137, at 420-22. But cf. Siegel, supra note
143, at 1132-48 (exploring alternative interpretive pathways available to the Court).
327. See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 303 (1992) ("The
condemnation of race segregation in the 1964 Civil Rights Act... bestowed legitimacy on the
Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education in a way that the Court could never have
accomplished on the basis of its authority alone.").
2000]
The Yale Law Journal
Second, because Congress, as a popular legislative body, is well
situated to perceive and express evolving cultural norms, Congress's
understanding of equality is a vital resource for the Court to consider as it
interprets the Equal Protection Clause. This point is perhaps most clearly
illustrated in the development of the law of sex discrimination. The Court
did not find that facial classifications based upon sex required intermediate
scrutiny until the 1970s, after the rise of the second-wave feminist
movement and congressional enactment of legislation prohibiting sex
discrimination in the workplace. In the pivotal case of Frontiero v.
Richardson,32 s the plurality opinion of the Court was frank to acknowledge
how congressional action had affected its own evolving attitude toward sex
discrimination:
We might also note that, over the past decade, Congress has itself
manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications. In
Tit. VH of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, Congress
expressly declared that no employer, labor union, or other
organization subject to the provisions of the Act shall discriminate
against any individual on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." Similarly, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 provides that
no employer.. . "shall discriminate ... between employees on the
basis of sex." And § 1 of the Equal Rights Amendment, passed by
Congress on March 22, 1972, and submitted to the legislatures of
the States for ratification, declares that "[e]quality of rights under
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of sex." Thus, Congress itself has concluded
that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious, and this
conclusion of a coequal branch of Government is not without
significance to the question presently under consideration.
3 29
When Congress in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
used its power under Section 5 to extend to the states Title VII's prohibition
of discrimination in employment,33° the Court had not yet held that sex-
based classifications should receive anything other than rational basis
review.331 Congressional reports explaining the 1972 Act, however,
emphasized the gravity of sex discrimination and its similarity to race
discrimination.332 By the time the Court had ratified Congress's use of
Section 5 in 1976, in an opinion by then-Justice Rehnquist in a case dealing
328. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
329. Id. at 687-88 (Brennan, J.) (footnotes omitted).
330. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, 103.
331. E.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76(1971), Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
332. H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 5 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2141 (Equal
Opportunity Act of 1972) ("Discrimination against women is no less serious than other forms of
prohibited employment practices and is to be accorded the same degree of social concern given to
any type of unlawful discrimination."); see also S. REP. No. 92-415, at 7-8 (1971).
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with sex discrimination,333 the Court's Section 1 jurisprudence had begun to
catch up with Congress's earlier vision of the Fourteenth Amendment.334
We suggest that this sequence of events is exemplary.
The Court's equal protection jurisprudence has emerged from a
partnership between the Court and the nation, with Congress as one
representative of the nation. Sometimes, as in Brown, the Court has forged
ahead and brought the nation with it; and sometimes, as with sex
discrimination, the Court has caught up to the vision of Congress and the
nation. When Congress exercised Section 5 power in 1972, it was
participating in the very dialogue that has helped to form the Court's own
contemporary equal protection doctrine.
We fear, however, that the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
would not have survived a stringent interpretation of the Boerne test.
Because the Court's equal protection jurisprudence of the time held that
states could discriminate against women subject only to rational basis
review for invidiousness, it could be said of Title VII's prohibition of sex
discrimination, as Kimel said about the ADEA, that it was "'so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be
understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional
behavior."' 335 If the Court in the 1970s had prohibited exercises of
Section 5 power that were not narrowly tailored to the Court's settled
understandings of unconstitutional behavior, it would have shut down the
very dialogue between Congress and the Court that has in part been
responsible for the development of equal protection jurisprudence as we
now know it. Such narrow tailoring implicitly assumes that the Court's own
equal protection doctrine is complete, settled, and immune from
modification in light of congressional action.
The Court can act on this assumption only at its peril. The Court's
interpretive authority was enhanced by its ability to learn from Congress in
Frontiero. Had the Court applied a narrowly tailored version of the Boerne
test to prevent Congress from applying Title VII's prohibition of sex
discrimination to the states, the Court would have risked producing a
Constitution estranged from the normative understandings of the political
community for which the Constitution purports to speak. Whether judicial
defiance of popular reason sustains judicial interpretive authority, as in
Cooper v. Aaron, or erodes it, as in Carter Coal, depends entirely on the
particular circumstances involved. It cannot be determined by general
principles of separation of powers. It certainly cannot be determined by a
strict, mechanical, and acontextual test of congruence and proportionality.
333. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
334. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
335. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 647 (2000) (quoting City of Boeme v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)).
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Considered from the perspective of history, then, it is clear that
concerns about preserving the Court's interpretive authority do not require
the Court to impose narrow tailoring on antidiscrimination legislation to
ensure that it closely conforms to the terms of the Court's own Section 1
jurisprudence. In fact, history suggests that there are circumstances in
which imposing such restrictions might well diminish, rather than enhance,
the Court's authority in interpreting the Constitution.
If the Court can assure itself that Section 5 legislation is enacted for the
purpose of "enforcing" the provisions of the Equal Protection Clause
without imposing the additional constraint of narrow tailoring, and if the
generic and uniform imposition of this constraint serves neither the values
of federalism nor those of separation of powers, how, then, are we to
account for the tendency of the Boerne test to slide into narrow tailoring?
We suggest that the Boerne test is actually a tool for restraining Congress
whenever the Court is indifferent or hostile to the constitutional values at
stake in particular instances of Section 5 legislation. It is a vehicle for the
Court to express substantive disagreement with Congress's understanding
of the Fourteenth Amendment, without the Court having itself to articulate,
explain, or defend a competing view of what the Equal Protection Clause
might require in the context of congressional enforcement.
What is at stake in such disagreements, however, is not merely the
constitutionality of particular statutes, like the ADEA. Instead, judicial
applications of the Boerne test alter the terms in which Congress can
participate in the antidiscrimination tradition inaugurated by the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. As the Court begins to subject Section 5 legislation to
harsh and unsympathetic review of a kind that the Court has avoided since
the first Reconstruction, it inaugurates a shift in the institutional ecology
that supported the elaboration and entrenching of equality norms during the
second Reconstruction.
The Court can invalidate particular exercises of Section 5 power
without harming the institutional relationships that have played so large a
role in vitalizing antidiscrimination law in the modem era. But this is not
the tendency and tone of the Court's decisions last Term, which seem at
root uninterested in Congress's reasons for enacting the antidiscrimination
statutes the Court invalidated. Neither Kimel nor Morrison endeavors
sympathetically to reconstruct and address the equality-based concerns that
led Congress to enact the invalidated provisions of the ADEA and VAWA.
Instead the Court seems to reason from the premise that its own authority in
enforcing the Equal Protection Clause renders Congress's role in enforcing
the Clause incidental and a ready target of judicial discipline. From this
standpoint, it would appear that the Court is now embarking on a project
that it has not pursued since the first Reconstruction: the task of cabining
and inhibiting democratic vindication of equality values.
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V. CONCLUSION
The dangers of the Court's new juricentric approach to Section 5 are
abundantly illustrated by the Morrison opinion. Morrison concludes its
account of why VAWA's civil rights remedy is unconstitutional with an
ominously ambiguous observation. Summarizing its case for invalidating
the statute, the Court remarks that if the facts concerning the "brutal
assault" alleged in the case "are true, no civilized system of justice could
fail to provide [the petitioner, Christy Brzonkala,] a remedy for the conduct
of respondent Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy must be
provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the United
States." 336
Is the Court saying that Virginia will provide Christy Brzonkala a
remedy if the facts she alleges are true, or merely that it should? It is telling
that we cannot discern the answer to this question from the opinion the
Court writes striking down the statute Congress enacted in an effort to
ensure that Christy Brzonkala would have a remedy if she proved the brutal
assault she alleged.
That this question remains unanswerable at the end of the Morrison
opinion, even after several readings, reveals something very important
about the way the Court decided the case. Morrison declares
unconstitutional Congress's efforts to remedy gender bias in the criminal
justice system without demonstrating that the Court understood the
constitutional concerns that moved Congress to enact the statute in the first
instance.
The Morrison opinion recounts, with citations to the record, Congress's
rationale for enacting the civil rights remedy. It reports that the "§ 5
argument is founded on an assertion that there is pervasive bias in various
state justice systems against victims of gender-motivated violence."337 It
accepts that "[t]his assertion is supported by a voluminous congressional
record," noting that "Congress received evidence that many participants in
state justice systems are perpetuating an array of erroneous stereotypes and
assumptions.""33 The Court acknowledges that Congress "concluded that
these discriminatory stereotypes often result in insufficient investigation
and prosecution of gender-motivated crime, inappropriate focus on the
behavior and credibility of the victims of that crime, and unacceptably
lenient punishments for those who are actually convicted of gender-
motivated violence.
336. 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1759 (2000).
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But if the Court recites Congress's rationale for enacting § 13981, it
evinces no interest in remedying the constitutional wrong that Congress
identified. Instead, the Court announces that "the language and purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment place certain limitations on the manner in
which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct"" even if "there has
been gender-based disparate treatment by state authorities." 3 41 What, then,
do we make of the Court's capacity (1) to recount Congress's findings of
gender bias in state administration of the criminal law; 2 (2) to invalidate
VAWA's civil rights remedy; and then, in the face of these findings, (3) to
send Christy Brzonkala back to Virginia for the remedy that "no civilized
system of justice could fail to provide her" if the facts of the "brutal
assault" she alleges are true? Does the Court not credit the evidence of
pervasive gender bias in state criminal justice systems that Congress
gathered? Or does the Court simply not judge this gender bias to be of
constitutional moment?
The Court sees questions of constitutional significance in Congress's
decision to supply Brzonkala a federal forum so that her claim will be heard
even if state fora are infected by gender bias. But it appears not to see a
question of constitutional importance in the possibility that gender bias in
state fora might leave a victim of a "brutal assault" without a remedy. At
root, the Court seems to be denying that such gender bias is a problem in
the United States, which, we are to presume, the Court considers to have a
"civilized system of justice."
This refusal to entertain the possibility of systemic constitutional wrong
informs and organizes the whole of the Morrison opinion, from its
insistence on treating VAWA's civil rights remedy as a species of domestic
relations or criminal law in its discussion of congressional commerce
power, to its elevation of federalism over gender equality values in its
treatment of congressional Section 5 power. The Court undertakes to
pronounce on the constitutionality of VAWA' s civil rights remedy without
truly grappling with the systemic nature and breadth of the constitutional
violation that Congress was undertaking to remedy.
To have faced this question openly would have been to acknowledge
the civil rights remedy, not as a species of family or criminal law, but as an
antidiscrimination statute with deep roots in the Court's own Section 1
jurisprudence. This Morrison never does. Section 13981 grows directly out
340. Id.
341. Id. at 1758.
342. In its enthusiasm to demonstrate that the civil rights remedy is not a congruent and
proportional response to the gender biases in the criminal justice system that prompted Congress
to enact § 13981, the Court takes liberties in characterizing Congress's factual findings and
asserts, without any supporting citation, that "Congress' findings indicate that the problem of
discrimination against the victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all States, or even
most states." Id. at 1759; see supra text accompanying note 164.
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of the Court's own sex discrimination jurisprudence, taking its normative
ends from the strengths of that jurisprudence and its practical urgency from
its weaknesses.343 Yet throughout Morrison the Court never acknowledges
the relationship of this Section 5 statute to the Court's own Section 1 case
law.
What then explains the Court's cavalier treatment of the constitutional
concerns that moved Congress to enact the civil rights remedy? Morrison
betrays the Court's conviction that, at least where matters of equal
protection are concerned, the Court has little to learn from Congress. The
Court brusquely denies Congress's Section 5 power to enact the civil rights
remedy, without cultivating even the appearance of a respectful working
relationship with the institution that is equally responsible under the
Fourteenth Amendment for enforcing the "provisions of this article." In
explaining its decision, the Court mentions, but does not discuss, the
voluminous record compiled during years of hearings and debates in which
Congress gathered evidence of gender bias in the criminal justice system
and discussed how it should be remedied. The Court does not treat the
innovative features of VAWA's civil rights remedy as meriting careful
consideration, but instead as prima facie reasons for the statute's
invalidation.
At root, the Court seems to view the enforcement of the Equal
Protection Clause as primarily a matter for the judiciary, treating
Congress's efforts to implement the Clause as superfluous or even suspect.
This juricentric approach to enforcing the Equal Protection Clause carries
with it the risk of institutional insularity, and Morrison well exemplifies
this danger. The gender conventionalism of the Court's reasoning about
federalism is striking,3" as is the Court's failure to evince any appreciation
of why Congress had concluded that the criminal justice system's
traditional methods of handling violence against women presented grave
problems of sex discrimination. In the hearings and debates leading up to
the enactment of VAWA, citizens and their congressional representatives
repeatedly asserted that the failures of the criminal justice system to protect
women from assault betrayed the nation's commitment to equal citizenship
for women. Morrison simply ignores these claims. The contrast with the
343. See Siegel, supra note 149, at 2188-96 (identifying doctrinal reasons why Section 1
cases only weakly constrain gender bias in the administration of the criminal law and suggesting
that the civil rights remedy might supplement adjudication under Section 1 as a means of
redressing the states' failure to protect women from assault).
344. The Court's analysis of the Commerce Clause invokes separate spheres discourse to
identify markets with matters of "national concern" and families with matters of "local concern";
its analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment discusses violence against women as occurring in a
"private" realm beyond the proper reach of federal law; and the opinion as a whole concludes by
sounding the familiar protectionist theme that any civilized society protects its women against
sexual assault.
2000]
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manner in which the Court in the 1970s attended to and learned
from congressional understandings of the harm of sex discrimination,
understandings that differed from the Court's own decisions, could not be
sharper.
The abstract criteria of the Boerne test invite courts to dismiss Section 5
antidiscrimination legislation with the same spirit of unsympathetic
insularity that characterizes Morrison. The test of congruence and
proportionality flattens and effaces the myriad subtle and complex ways
that Congress has participated in the development of our modem equal
protection tradition. The mechanical application of the test to Section 5
legislation promises to stunt the ability of Congress to participate in the
future development of that tradition. Applied without an appreciation of the
actual evolution of modem equal protection jurisprudence, the Boerne test
could easily invalidate large stretches of federal antidiscrimination law and
suppress the lively relationship between Congress and the courts that has in
the past animated our vision of what equal protection demands.
And that, for reasons we have tried to explain, threatens forms of
institutional dialogue within which Americans have attempted to work out
the meanings of national citizenship during the past half century.
